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The Civic Action concept as an instrument of U.S. foreign aid policy.

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THE CIVIC ACTION CONCEPT AS AN INSTRUMENT OF U. S. FOREIGN AID POLICY

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by

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Thesis Abstract

The Civic Action Concept as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Aid Policy

by Thomas P. Scott

U. S. Foreign Aid Policy has been the basis for extensive political and scholarly debate for several years. It has been insinuated that this area of foreign policy has become uncontrollable, and that the goals set forth in the field of foreign aid have become unrealistic and/or unattainable.

The Civic Action concept has gained considerable renown in recent years, especially since the adoption by the Communists of the practice of unconventional warfare. Utilizing the stated purposes of U. S. foreign aid, and developing a realistic policy within these parameters, the writer has set forth a concept of Civic Action, and how such approach would be beneficial to the United States in its efforts to achieve the overall goals of foreign aid. A working definition of Civic Action was rendered, certain problem areas were investigated, and the feasibility of applying Civic Action where possible was discussed.

The conclusion drawn are considered valid within the framework of the writer's definition of a realistic foreign aid policy.

Thesis Abstract

The Civic Action Concept as an Instrument of U. S. Foreign Aid Policy

by Thomas G. Smith

U. S. Foreign Aid Policy has been the basis for extensive political and scholarly debate for several years. It has been demonstrated that this area of foreign policy has become uncontrollable, and that the goals set forth in the field of foreign aid have become unrealistic and/or unattainable.

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The conclusions drawn are considered vital within the framework of the writer's definition of a realistic foreign aid policy.

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INTRODUCTION

Few problems facing the American people today, and the United States Government, are so filled with emotion, half-truth, misunderstanding, ignorance, and plain confusion as that of American foreign aid policy. Yet there are few problems which may have such immediate and long-range importance to the United States, for on the outcome of decisions in this vital area depends the future of this nation.

In the age of rapidly approaching nuclear stalemate, and with the increasing realization by leaders all over the world that political objectives are less and less attainable by the traditional use of physical force,[1] the foreign policy instrument of foreign aid, both military and economic, has become a primary element in the bags of political tools of competing statesmen. Faced with this unique military phenomenon, and the added complexity of the international atmosphere brought about by the staunchly anti-democratic ideology of the communist system, every instrument available to states in their

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[1] Walter Lippmann, "Today and Tomorrow," The Washington Post, July 19, 1963. Mr. Lippmann, in an analysis of a recent Soviet release concerning the Sino-Soviet ideological talks, related the fact that one of the primary sources of the dispute between the two communist powers has been the realization of the dangers of nuclear war by the Soviets, and the apparent corresponding lack of concern on the part of the Chinese.

efforts to achieve success in the foreign policy endeavors has grown immensely in relative importance. Further added to the military and ideological confrontation facing policy makers is the revolutionary explosion of the underdeveloped nations struggling for a better life, usually earmarked by considerable, or even extreme impatience. This so-called "revolution of rising expectations" must be reckoned with, in no less considered fashion than the other problems which the nation has encountered on the international scene, if for no other reason than the fact that they are all so closely intertwined.

Charges leveled at the United States' foreign aid policy have been both rational and irrational, well-founded and ill-founded, answerable and unanswerable.[2] A great number of the claims and-or charges have been the result of differences of opinion concerning basic foreign policy, and have not been adaptable to concise resolution regarding what the policies and procedures in the foreign aid policy ought or ought not to be. This inadequacy might be attributed to the fact that specific objectives have not been delineated. (By specific is meant those objectives other than general goals of survival, security, and peaceful progress.) A certain vagueness is inherent in the problem, since there is the further necessity for making such judgments as to the

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[2] DeVere E. Pentony, Foreign Aid: Readings in the Problem Area of Wealth (San Francisco: Chandler Pub. Co., 1960), p. 1.

actual extent of United States vital interests, and what actually is needed for the national security in relation to the international situation at any given period.

There are no clear-cut, universally applicable answers to the problem of foreign aid. However, it may prove more advantageous from the United States policy standpoint to follow certain courses of action in implementing the foreign aid program. It is the purpose of this paper to investigate a phase of the program which has been receiving considerable attention and increased prominence among policy makers recently. It has become known as Civic Action, and the investigation has been made with the view toward assessing its political, military, socio-economic, and psychological utility as the possible connecting link in the total aid effort in those areas where its application appears feasible. It was considered appropriate to precede the discussion of this particular aspect with a conceptual analysis of foreign aid in general, so as to establish with maximum perspicuity the writer's interpretation of the United States approach. A fundamental base upon which the Civic Action concept has been constructed has also been provided by this preliminary analysis.

Some factors which the writer feels add to the potential of the Civic Action concept are:

1. An increased pressure within the United States for greater

economy, and less overall expenditure in assistance programs.

2. The need for the development of basic skills and other essentials, such as power, roads, communications facilities in the underdeveloped countries before any real progress can be made on a larger economic level.

3. With regard to 2., above, the growing realization among donors that the "pitch" of the present economic development programs may be aimed above the level of the self-help capabilities of the underdeveloped nations.

4. The need for the development of a stronger feeling of national unity within these countries, and the possible utility of a national institution--the military--in the nurturing of such a spirit.

5. The need for some effort in bettering living conditions and public health and safety during that precarious transition period from initial disturbance to "take-off."

6. The present nature of the threat of internal subversion in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

Several factors which must be borne in mind when discussing or analyzing the problem of foreign aid policy are worthy of mention at the outset. These are:

1. There is an inherent misleading factor in this area when attempting to draw generalizations about the program and all its

ramifications.

2. It must be realized that the United States, as a democratic society with American peculiarities, imposes very real limitations on the policy maker and the methods he may choose to implement a foreign aid policy. These limitations are accepted by choice, and by this is inferred the existence of an additional source of misunderstanding and disagreement, since the degree of compromise or surrender of these values is a matter of personal judgment.

3. Foreign aid is but one instrument available to the United States in the field of foreign policy. To attempt to substitute foreign aid in an area which is lacking in a sound foreign policy is to discredit aid and lead to its ultimate rejection by the American people.[3] A quoted passage from the Interim Report of the President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, the Draper Committee, in 1959, reflected that possibility:

> In our fascination with our own mistakes, and the constant use of foreign aid for a whipping boy, we may be gradually choking this vital feature of our national security policy to death.[4]

4. Civic Action, in terms of reference which are satisfied

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[3] The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Interim Report (Washington: The Draper Committee, 1959), p. 5.

[4] Ibid.

when applying it as defined herein, is but one segment of the foreign aid program, and must be viewed in that perspective. It would serve no purpose to assert that Civic Action programs could or should replace other types of primarily military defense assistance where the obstacles to such implementation are obvious.

CHAPTER I

U. S. PHILOSOPHY IN THE INTERNATIONAL SPHERE

The National Interest

> It is the American interest to maintain a world environment for the United States within which American society can continue to develop in conformity with the humanistic tendencies which are at its foundation.[1]

This definition, as set forth by Professor W. W. Rostow, has expressed succinctly the concept of the United States national interest. It was meant to include the physical protection of the country, according to Mr. Rostow, but was not specifically stated because it was considered to be ". . . a means to a larger end--the protection of a still developing way of life."[2]

A treatment of the question of national interest was considered necessary because it has been acknowledged to be the focal point about which the activities of states in their international relations evolves. It has motivated states to follow specified courses of action, even in instances when alternative actions, in the view of

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[1] W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena (New York: Harper & Bros., 1960), p. 543.

[2] Ibid.

other states, would be deemed more appropriate. As change occurs in the world environment, a nation is faced with the task of assessing that change with respect to its own national interests, and it must choose a course of action (no action being a possible choice) based on an estimation of a situation.

It has been decided that the occupation of the Eurasian land mass by any one power or coalition of powers hostile to this nation would not be in the national interest. It has likewise been determined contrary to the national interest to permit the development of a world environment in which basically democratic societies would not be permitted to grow.[3] The nation's stake in the world in an ideological sense has proved to be just as real as that of a political, or of a military nature.

In the modern era of mass communications the nations of the globe have become more closely associated, and the American national interest has taken on a global dimension. In essence, the judgment has been made to the effect that there is no area of the world where military, political, economic, or psychological change might occur which will not in some manner or degree, favorably or adversely, involve the national interest of the United States.

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[3] Ibid., p. 547. See also, U. S. Congress, Senate, The Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Foreign Aid Program, Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Document no. 52, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., July, 1957, pp. 16-20, for a fundamental discussion of the American national interest.

The Nature of the Threat

There are two ways of looking at the world today. One is to view external happenings with an eye toward the resultant effect these may have on United States interests and security. Such a view requires the knowledge of what the interests of the country are, and how conditions can best be shaped to maximize the possibility of satisfying those interests. It requires an accurate assessment of the summation of forces acting on the international scene, and a knowledge of the likely effect they will have on the nation-state system, and in particular on the United States as a component of that system. This is a viewpoint which portrays the national self-interest primarily. It requires an effort toward manipulating the summation of forces in such a way that the security of the United States will be maximized to the extent possible. Allies are sought to provide as strong a defense as possible against any aggressive acts of a potentially hostile nation, or group of nations. This accumulation of power, at the same time, has the reverse effect of minimizing the security of an adversary. The matter of security, then, is relative in nature. No position can be considered to be absolutely secure, except perhaps a "Pax-Americana," which is not a situation the United States is aspiring to create.

Another way in which the world may be viewed is that United

States interests and security are directly dependent upon the creation of some system of world order which would be compatible with continued development of the United States as the kind of nation it is, and is desirous of becoming. This viewpoint is twofold in nature in that it adds a constructive element to the defensive one of merely lining up and attempting to contain opposing forces.[4]

The rapid advance of the age of mass communication, modern science and technology, coupled with a parallel rise in the nationalistic spirit of the emerging nations, the demise of colonialism (with an attendant growth of an anti-colonialist ideology), and the drive for modernization has brought about a condition of change upon the nation-state system which is so dynamic that it virtually defies classification as an ordered system. The complexity of the international situation has been further increased by the economic, military, political, and ideological challenge of the communist bloc nations,[5] led by the only other major nuclear power, the Soviet Union. This latter

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[4] Paul H. Nitze, "United States Policy and Foreign Aid," Final Report International Stability and Progress, The Air Force Academy Assembly, United States Air Force Academy, (April 1-4, 1959), pp. 17-34.

[5] Jay H. Cerf and Walter Posen, Strategy for the 60's (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961), pp. 1-28. The authors summarized 13 special foreign policy studies made in 1959-60, and listed the major challenges to the United States as (1) the role of the emerging nations; (2) the Sino-Soviet threat; and (3) the destructive power of thermonuclear weapons and the increasing number of nations possessing them.

phenomenon, and its balancing effect in the nuclear power relationship between East and West, has contributed to the increased importance of the underdeveloped world. These nations have been thrust into the limelight in the struggle, which has caused some to act capriciously in the conduct of their domestic and foreign affairs. In their drive to achieve a position abreast of the more industrialized nations of the world, the emerging states have mounted the "fence" in an effort to hasten the realization of their national ambitions. In other cases, where neutralism and noncommitment have not been the chosen policies, these nations have increased considerably the nature of their requests, and demands.[6] They are faced with the general problems of assembling their resources and organizing their nationalistic fervor in such a way that will permit them to operate effectively as a sovereign state on the international scene, and to achieve economic progress at home.[7] The problem itself is not new, but the setting in which it has been placed has provided a new focus.

> The economic distress of the underdeveloped countries is centuries old; what is new is that the impact of the West has given their discontent a 'political' focus. They want to telescope into a few years the progress that took us generations to accomplish. In short, they have got their steam

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[6] John D. Montgomery, The Politics of Foreign Aid (New York: F. A. Praeger, for The Council on Foreign Relations 1962), p. 244.

[7] W. W. Rostow, op. cit., p. 430.

> up and are ready to roll. We can try to block their advance; we can stand aside; or we can ride with them and help steer. The first course would be foolhearty if not futile; the second, short-sighted; the last is in our national interest.[8]

The excitement has been heightened by the entry of the Soviet Union into these areas in their "competitive" role with a "trade and aid" policy designed to further their own interests.[9] Their aims have appeared to be threefold. They have been designed to break up the Western Alliance system, decrease the level of Western influence in the underdeveloped areas, and to enhance their own position in these

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[8] Forrest D. Murden, Underdeveloped Lands 'Revolution of Rising Expectations' (New York: Foreign Policy Association, Foreign Policy Series No. 119, 1956), p. 4.

[9] Hans J. Morgenthau, The Restoration of American Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962), pp. 250. Mr. Morgenthau related that the latest Soviet interest concerning the struggle against capitalism" . . . has left the Marsist-Leninist theory that the fall of capitalism will come about as the result of a series of world wars. His [Khrushchev's] theory purports to prove that the United States will fall as a result of being outstripped economically by the Russian, or Communist system. He says capitalism is inferior in economic organization and productivity. As he put it to the noted newspaper columnist and author, Walter Lippmann, America enjoys 'the last years of greatness.' The Soviet Union is destined to surpass the United States in economic productivity and well-being; and by demonstrating its economic superiority over the United States, it will set an example which the underdeveloped masses of the earth will want to emulate. They will choose the Soviet rather than the American way of life. Furthermore, this economic superiority will enable the Soviet Union to wage full-scale economic war against the United States by taking away its foreign markets and integrating the underdeveloped areas of the world into its economic and political system. Thus, without firing a shot, the Soviet Union will triumph over the United States."

areas insofar as possible.[10] The shift in Soviet strategy from the military to the economic front can be understood in light of the incalculable risks involved in such methods as direct aggression to gain control. The possibility of engaging in a direct conflict with the United States, and its nuclear power, through the escalation of a local conflict has had an inhibiting effect on the Soviets, and has lessened the chance that they would start another Korea. This inhibitive factor may not apply in the case of Communist China, although they have appeared hesitant in instances where a direct confrontation has been likely.[11] It has also been suggested that the success realized in the United States military assistance programs may have contributed to the Soviet policy shift.[12]

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[10] Joseph S. Berliner, Soviet Economic Aid (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1958), pp. 15ff.

[11] James Emmett Garvey, Marxist-Leninist China: Military and Social Doctrine (New York: Exposition Press, 1960), Ch. 7. Dr. Garvey emphasized the "privileged" position the United States has occupied in the Chinese efforts to realize success in their revolution. The United States has constantly been the primary antagonist in the Chinese attempt to resolve the contradictions in their own system, and in their attempts to extend that system in other areas.

[12] The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Supplement to the Composite Report (Vol. II), August, 1959, p. 69. This conclusion was reached in the process of analyzing the increasing emphasis of the Communist programs on economic penetration, and the associated concern shown by many experts in the United States regarding the specific utility of military assistance in the underdeveloped areas.

The Proxy Wars

The expansionist policy of the Soviet Union has continued since the advent of nuclear weapons, but on a different level. They have resorted to exploiting discontent and instability wherever it has been found. The technique has been labelled "Proxy Wars."[13] The advantage of this approach has become apparent when considering the legalistic concepts of the West, and the associated theory of "aggression."

Chairman Khrushchev has stated that:

> The theory of so-called local or minor wars with the use of mass destruction weapons has sprung up in the West [The theory of limited nuclear war]. With such wars the imperialists want to suppress the national liberation movement and do away with governments which do not suit them. Yet we must not think that under present conditions minor wars would be localized. Should such wars break out, they could soon grow into a world war."[14]

If the above statement can be referred to as a rejection by the Soviets of the theory of limited nuclear war, then it could be assumed that the conflict has been pitched at a still lower level of competition--that of subversion, infiltration, guerrilla warfare, or the all-inclusive theory of the national liberation movement.

Mr. Khrushchev further expounded on his strategy of peaceful

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[13] N. H. Mager and Jacques Katel (eds.), Conquest Without War (New York: Pocket Books, Inc., 1961), pp. 324-29.

[14] Ibid., p. 326.

The Supreme Court

The Supreme Court of the United States has sometimes been
the source of decisions relevant to [illegible]. They have
attempted to maintain a balance and sometimes succeeded. The
[illegible] The Constitution has been [illegible] [illegible]
[illegible] It is a document that requires [illegible] and
the [illegible] example of the Court and [illegible]
[illegible].

[illegible] Supreme Court has ruled that

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[illegible] The ruling of [illegible] [illegible]
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[illegible] [illegible], p. [illegible].

coexistence in a report given at a meeting of leading Soviet theoreticians and propagandists. He declared that:

> [The policies of peaceful coexistence and disarmament] be used as primary weapons to bring about the final defeat of capitalist 'Imperialism' and the establishment of communism throughout the world. . . . [We are] supporters of all such national liberation movements wherein the popular masses are fighting against colonial rulers or against capitalist governments.[15]

It has become apparent since 1961 that this strategy has, in fact, been adopted by the Soviet Union in the pursuit of its national objectives. The United States, as leader of the free world community, has been directing its efforts to meet these challenges. Less comforting, however, has been the realization that the Soviets have been left with the option of shifting their strategy. Their ability to select the competition has required the West to maintain an impressive conventional and military force for deterrent and defensive purposes.[16] The Chinese Communists, in asserting their independence from the Soviets, have added the need for military strength, since they have shown themselves to be quite ready to resort to active belligerency.[17]

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[15] New York Times, January 19, 1961.

[16] The President's Committee, Composite Report, p. 147.

[17] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, Military Posture, Hearings before Committee on H. R. 2440, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., January 30, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 288-290.

Secretary of Defense McNamara categorized the nature of the threat by using various groups of nations as determinants:

> (1) Those who in the main face only the threat of internal aggression--the now familiar pattern of penetration, infiltration, subversion, dissidence and guerrilla warfare; (2) those who face the threat of direct military aggression in addition to international aggression; and (3) the special situation in the NATO area.[18]

The international situation has been studied, and the need for a foreign aid program as a foreign policy instrument has been realized. How it should be utilized to produce the best results has not been universally agreed upon. Considerable difference of opinion has arisen among academicians, politicians, and the citizenry regarding the matter, and the succeeding chapter has been devoted to that problem.

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[18] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, The International Development and Security Act, Hearings before Committee on H. R. 7372, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., June 8, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1961), Part I, p. 69.

CHAPTER II

THE AMERICAN CONCEPT(S) OF FOREIGN AID

Various writings in the field of foreign aid have revealed several factors which are common to all, generally, but with different particular approaches. They fell within three basic classifications of (1) economic, (2) political, and (3) humanitarian.[1] There have also been a sufficient number who have opposed the concept of foreign aid. For that reason a representative view of a dissenting voice has been presented. No distinct separation could be discerned in every case, nor have dissenting elements condemned the entire program in every respect. The concept of foreign aid has contained so many interrelating factors that precise division has proved practically impossible.

The economic approach has revealed proposals which most Americans would like to see in operation. The political approach contained factors which have related to the international situation as it has usually existed. The humanitarian approach contained a basis for an operation as it probably ought to be, and in the negative approach

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[1] James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck, (eds.), Foreign Aid Reexamined (Washington: Public Affairs Press, 1958), p. 1, wherein it was stated that "The foreign aid programs of the United States owe their existence to humanitarian, economic, and political motives."

could be found objections based on any number of conditions. It should be remembered that humanitarian principles, while providing funds, have not always coincided with political objectives; and that national security gains have been more illustrative in military alliance terms than in long-range, little evidenced economic development conditions. What has been most often encountered in the field of foreign aid has been an economist in a political post, defending the foreign aid program on essentially humanitarian principles.

In order to provide a basis for further analysis, a summary view of representative proponents in each of the above classifications has been considered appropriate.

The Economic Approach

Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, in their book, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy,[2] have incorporated a majority of the proposals which have been considered representative of the economic approach.[3] The authors asked several basic questions concerning American foreign aid policy, and attempted to analyze them

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[2] Max F. Millikan and W. W. Rostow, A Proposal: Key to an Effective Foreign Policy (New York: Harper & Bros., 1957).

[3] See also, U.S. Congress, Senate, The Special Committee to Study the Foreign Aid Program, Foreign Aid Program, Compilation of Studies and Surveys, Document No. 52, 85th Cong., 1st Sess., July, 1957, Study No. 3, "The Role of Foreign Aid in the Development of Other Countries," March, 1957, pp. 149-246.

with respect to what had been done in the past and what the policy should be. Aid could, they contended, provide an effective instrument for producing political, social, and psychological results which would be in the national interest of the United States. This reasoning was that the American goals of survival and long life would nuture such conditions that would permit this to happen. They saw the need for a policy change from one of a negative to a positive nature, because to be against something--communism--did not always meet with understanding among the underdeveloped countries. The errors of expecting gratitude and insisting on stereotypes were also pointed out. It was recommended that the United States approach the foreign aid program in a cold, business-like manner, giving it the profit and loss test--not in terms of money spent, friends won or lost, or United States versus communist wins or losses, but in terms of viable, stable societies capable of effecting change in a peaceful way. The sole obligation of the United States, according to Millikan and Rostow, would be to provide these nations with a choice, and that the choice in the end was theirs to make.

To offset the "fair share" approach which the authors felt was being used by the United States, they recommended a "staging" concept which was designed to establish measurable criteria for receiving economic assistance. The three stages--preconditioning,

take-off, and self-sustaining--would eliminate the allocation of funds on equity or political grounds.[4]

It was recommended that the United States embark upon a long-term aid effort as soon as possible, with further assurance that there would be sufficient capital to meet the needs of the program. An effort should also be made to enlist the help of the other developed countries in this undertaking. There should be no military or political strings attached to the acceptance of aid, but simply a strict business-type atmosphere.[5]

A new co-ordinating body should be established, they felt, which could be used for setting up the ground rules, and securing acceptance of the criteria for assistance. This body should be an international one if it could be established without detracting from the overall continuity of the program.

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[4]For a detailed descriptive treatment of the economic transitions and obstacles which often create tensions and lead to political instability, see W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth: A Non-Communist Manifesto (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1960).

[5]Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.), American Strategy for the Nuclear Age (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1960), pp. 375-387. Dr. Arnold Wolfers, in his article, "Military or Economic Assistance: Questions of Priority," has presented an interesting query concerning the interim period. He stated that "Victory in this competition may come long before the long-run projects are completed, and in fact independently of whether they ever are completed or ever prove economically sound."

The Millikan-Rostow plan, generally representative of the economic approach to foreign aid,[6] was not, according to the authors, a matter of sacrifice or strain economically, but a matter of will. Regarding this aspect, President Kennedy, in his message to Congress on April 2, 1963, concerning foreign aid, said:

> The United States today is spending over 10 per cent of its Gross National Product on programs primarily aimed at improving our national security. Somewhat less than 1/20th of this amount, and less than 0.7 per cent of our GNP, goes into the mutual assistance program: roughly half for economic development, and half for military and other short-term assistance. The richest nation in the world would surely be justified in spending less than 1 per cent of its national income on assistance to its less fortunate sister nations solely as a matter of international responsibility. . . .[7]

The Political Approach

Representative proponents of the political approach, or concept, of foreign aid have been Messrs. Morgenthau and Liska.

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[6] Max F. Millikan, "New and Old Criteria for Foreign Aid," in Thomas P. Peardon (ed.), The New Look in Foreign Aid (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1962), pp. 28-49. Mr. Millikan's article has presented an updated version of his proposals, and has given consideration for political realities concerning foreign aid. He made such statements as ". . . of course, the application of the test must include an evaluation of intangible factors. For example, conspicuous projects can strengthen national pride and unity and thereby increase the willingness of the people to make sacrifices that are necessary for rapid growth. . . ." And ". . . Again, there is considerable agreement among experts on the nature of the devices required, although a judgement as to whether the effort is adequate must always, in the last analysis, involve a political estimate."

[7] Text of the President's Message to Congress on Foreign Aid, The Washington Post, April 3, 1963.

Hans Morgenthau, in an article in The American Political Science Review[8] in June, 1962, outlined a realistic, political approach to the problems of foreign aid. His argument was not concerned with foreign aid as a policy tool. That was accepted as a matter of fact. He considered foreign aid to be an indispensible means of getting things done in instances where others--diplomacy, for example, in and of itself--could not, or where extreme methods such as armed force could not be justified. The major concern has been with the amount of money spent, and not the substance of the purpose of aid, and how it best serves American interests. The purpose, as suggested by Mr. Morgenthau, should be to ensure survival and promote peaceful progress.[9] The United States policy has been "weak," and has only accidentally been related to the political purposes of American foreign policy, he asserted.

He classified foreign aid in six basic categories, as (1) humanitarian, (2) subsistence, (3) military, (4) bribery, (5) prestige, and (6) economic development assistance. Only humanitarian assistance could be legitimately considered non-political aid, and then it would depend on the circumstances under which it was proffered.

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[8] Hans J. Morgenthau, "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid," The American Political Science Review, LVI, (June, 1962), p. 301-310.

[9] The identity of purpose in aid policy can be noted between the political and economic theorists in their otherwise different approaches to foreign aid. See p. 13, above.

An interesting phenomenon was developed regarding past practices of rendering aid to a country for a purpose other than as openly agreed. A bribe, for example, might be given to a country in the guise of economic development assistance, or jet planes given under the pretext of military assistance when they are nothing more than prestige items, and of questionable utility to the recipient. Such activities have been referred to as "cross-purposing" foreign aid. This tendency has led to considerable ambiguity, loss of effectiveness of foreign aid, and widespread criticism of the program by the Congress and the American people.

Mr. Morgenthau expressed a concern for the developing climate of opinion in the country which has embraced the notion that economic development can be promoted simply by the transfer of goods and services alone. He referred to this misconception as "playacting" which could only lead to ultimate disenchantment by all involved. Advantages have been lost by the donor, and a clear distinction of purpose has not been possible. The United States as donor nation has not always been able to justify aid in such cases, and when that has occurred, often times political advantages have been forfeited.

He proposed that the economists have been working under a basically wrong assumption about foreign aid in that they have ignored

the fact that all the aid in the world could not transform some societies suffering from natural and social deficiencies. He drew an analogy between bums and beggars within a national society and bum and beggar nations within the international community. Aid itself would not change cultural beliefs, or cause land reform, or provide sufficient relief where the basic rudiments of savings for capital formation were not in evidence. Success would rely not on economic theories alone, but on political, moral, and social preconditions which, if non-existent, could not be readily inculcated in societies from external sources.

The Morgenthau plea called for a country by country program guided principally by the careful selection of country experts. He believed the economist, like the general, has a place in the overall aid effort, but he should not be relied upon to devise policy.

The Liska approach, while similar in the political vein, contained a marked difference in the manner of aid classification. In his book, A New Statecraft,[10] Mr. Liska placed foreign aid under two general headings. These were simply acquisitive and creative aid. Briefly stated, acquisitive aid would be that proffered for

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[10] George A. Liska, A New Statecraft: Foreign Aid in American Foreign Policy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1960).

political purposes specifically, and creative aid would have as its primary objective the assistance of states in their efforts toward economic development. This latter form of aid would probably unavoidably carry secondarily political implications.

He surmised that if power[11] is the core of politics, then control is the manifestation of both power and politics. In order to achieve genuine co-operation in the field of foreign aid, there must be a balance of reciprocal control established between the donor and the recipient. The aspects of control should be one of optimacy, and not maximum control by either party. To strive for a position of maximum control would be unrealistic, except in instances where the recipient had no alternatives whatever, or where it happened to be immune to negative prestige. Situations vary, and each would have to be examined in terms of serving the ultimate objective of American and free world security.

Mr. Liska's central plea was for the achievement of a sense of long-run consistency, and short-run flexibility in United States foreign aid policy. To do this, he saw the need for a more highly sophisticated degree of statecraft on the part of those in the areas

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[11] Bertrand Russell, Power (New York: Barnes & Noble, 1962), p. 9. "Power . . ," said Lord Russell, "is the fundamental concept in social science." He sees power in many forms, such as wealth, armaments, civil authority, influence on opinion.

of responsibility. From a non-committed nation, he felt the United States should demand a similar degree on non-commitment. (India and Pakistan have served as good examples of "predicament producers" in this regard.) There should be a continuous effort made to remain non-involved and non-identified with those governments which have not been in consonance with American objectives and ideals, but who may qualify for political assistance for strategic reasons. Non-involvement and non-identification should not be construed to mean the complete surrendering of control over aid, or the termination of aid in every case where the recipients are not political and/or military allies. Quite the contrary, according to Mr. Liska. Aid in a sense should function in a manner not unlike diplomatic recognition. It should not, by the mere fact that it has been given, connote moral approval of the recipient government involved.

Foreign aid, as conceived by the political proponents, evidenced in the above examples, has been viewed as a useful tool in the conduct of United States foreign policy. Economic development as an end in itself, has not been the main concern of this school of thought. They have shown particular concern for the way in which the United States has become involved in an indiscriminate doling out of funds with no apparent pattern of consistency or sense of direction, thereby defeating the purpose for which aid could serve.

The Humanitarian Approach

Universal humanitarian values--freedom from hunger, sickness, and poverty--has pervaded United States foreign aid policy thinking at virtually every level. Americans have generally shown a feeling of moral obligation to the less fortunate peoples of the world.[12] This approach has been adequately expressed through statements by President Kennedy and Secretary of State Rusk. The President, in his Inaugural Address in January, 1961, said:

> To those people in the huts and villages of half the globe struggling to break the bonds of mass misery, we pledge our best efforts to help them help themselves, for whatever period is required--not because the Communists are doing it, not because we seek their votes, but because it is right. If a free society cannot help the many who are poor, it cannot save the few who are rich.[13]

Secretary Rusk, in a statement before the Senate Foreign Relations Committees during the hearings on the proposed new foreign aid legislation in 1961, stated the matter quite eloquently:

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[12] In Wiggins and Schoeck (eds.), op. cit., pp. 2-3, Professor Rippy recorded some caustic observations in his contribution on "Compulsory Benevolence." He observed that ". . . clergymen have supported these programs with a zeal so constant that one wonders whether church leaders ever advocated separation of church and state with any other motive than that of religious toleration and whether their vigorous support of these programs will compel citizens to contribute to global charity from now until judgement day. . . . Moreover, the public officials of the United States have adopted the views of the religious and humanitarian groups."

[13] John F. Kennedy, Inaugural Address, January 20, 1961, excerpt cited in United States Government, Department of State, The Story of A. I. D. (Washington: AID, 1961).

But this competition or national self-interest is not the essence of the program we are discussing. We need no other reason to support these measures than the profound and overriding fact that they are right.

It is right to do these things because peoples are in need of help and we are able to help them to help themselves; because their children sicken and die while we have the science to save them; because they are illiterate while we have the means of education and knowledge; because their agricultural methods and tools win them an annual income of $50 from the soil while we have the capital and technical skill to help them live like human beings.

Nor is there assurance that this aid will save the underdeveloped world. But those who opposed foreign aid must accept the consequences of their opposition. They must understand that, if they succeed, they deny the people in the emergent societies their last great hope for independent development and therefore condemn them to the high probability of Communist servitude--and us to Communist world encirclement.

These programs of aid in the past 15 years, economic and military, have cost a great deal of money and deserve our thoughtful and critical reflection. The sums amount to approximately 1.5 per cent of our Gross National Product during that period. We can never know, fortunately, what our costs--or our fate--might have been otherwise, for history does not reveal its alternatives. If we have not accomplished all that we had hoped, perhaps our hopes were too sanguine, our understanding of this turbulent epoch too limited. What has been achieved is a great deal--an opportunity for a free people, associated with friends and allies in all parts of the world, to continue the effort to build a decent world order.[14]

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[14]United States Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, International Development and Security, hearings before Committee, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., on S. 1983, May 31, 1961 (Washington: GPO, 1961), 2 Parts, pp. 32-3.

The Negative Approach

To a sizable number of Americans the entire foreign aid effort has been looked upon as nothing more than a giant "giveaway program."[15] Many object to certain segments of the foreign aid program, reflecting generally specific spheres of discontent. However, there has been considerably strong opposition developing since 1960, and earlier, whose concern has been for the general health of the nation, or from a deep conviction that foreign aid, in certain instances, has worked contrary to the national interests of the nation.

Congressman Otto E. Passman (D-La), Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, has been characterized by observers of the Congressional process as ". . . the most powerful Congressional antagonist of Foreign Aid."[16] Mr. Passman, in a recent interview with reporters from The New York Times, said ". . . it has been, in my opinion, one of the greatest foreign policy failures in history. . . ."[17] He gave four basic reasons why he felt the foreign aid program of the United States was wrong.

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[15] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Hearings before Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., on H. R. 5490, April 23-25, and 29, 1963, Part II. A representative statement, not unlike many others made throughout the hearings was uttered by Congressman H. R. Gross (R-Iowa), to General Clay who was appearing before the Committee: "We have about reached the end of the string as far as policing and wet-nursing the rest of the world is concerned." Part II, pp. 302-303.

[16] The New York Times Magazine, July 7, 1963, pp. 16-17.

[17] Ibid.

1. Foreign aid has undermined the dollar. Mr. Passman pointed to the fact that the United States has given aid to approximately 104 countries, at the cost of $120 billion, interest included. He insisted that foreign aid spending has been at the root of the American balance of payments problem, and that it has placed the country in a financially unhealthy position.

2. Foreign aid has made the dollar a symbol of international charity. The Congressman criticized the "fact" that a belief of moral responsibility has been inculcated in the less-favored nations. The majority of the recipients have also carried less of a tax burden than the U. S. taxpayer, he asserted.

3. The aid program has not only become an added tax on United States producers, but also a subsidy to foreign competitors. This has come about as a result of higher prices for American goods on the world market, caused largely by the nation's wasteful giving, which has rapidly depleted its wealth and resources.

4. Despite the tremendous aid expenditures and commitments, the United States position in the world has remained a precarious one. This nation became great because it had a fair foreign policy based substantially on trade. Today, through foreign aid, the United States has substituted a policy of "dollar diplomacy"--bordering on appeasement.

The Congressman acknowledged the fact that the program could not be realistically terminated abruptly in light of current international conditions; but he felt it his duty to minimize and curtail as much of the waste and mismanagement as would be possible under the circumstances.[18]

Other arguments, of varying degree and kind, fell somewhere within the above categories, and further elaboration would be repetitious.[19]

Summary--A Realistic Foreign Aid Policy

The following summary has been set forth for two reasons primarily.

1. An attempt has been made to present United States foreign aid policy as it has developed, exists today, and as it is likely to function in the foreseeable future.

2. By relating the writer's interpretation of 1., above, a foundation for the establishment of a Civic Action concept has hopefully been developed. Such a foundation was thought necessary so

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[18] Ibid. The reasoning behind Mr. Passman's objections to the foreign aid program were spelled out explicitly, and has not been the result of the writer's interpretation of the article.

[19] See also, James W. Wiggins and Helmut Schoeck (eds.), loc. cit.; William J. Lederer and Eugene L. Burdick, The Ugly American (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1958); and Eugene W. Castle, Billions, Blunders, and Baloney (New York: Devin Adair Co., 1955).

that practical ground rules could be delimited for testing the applicability of the Civic Action concept with regard to functional effectiveness.

Much confusion and fustration concerning United States foreign aid policy has resulted from an attempt to operate the program in contradiction to past experience and the lessons of history.[20] The primary purpose of the program has been to arrest the advances of communism, and to preserve the international peace. The United States approach to the problem of spreading communism has been to bolster governments and regimes of an anti-communist nature in those areas where the threat has emerged, and not without good reason. It would be of negative value in terms of American national interests to permit a nation threatened with communist take-over to succumb as a result of its inability to resist. That such a nation's methods of government have been of a questionable nature when compared to democratic principles, must be relegated to a position secondary to its national survival. In the long run, other methods may be brought to bear on the situation in an effort to engender the adoption of democratic principles in government.

This nation has also operated (generally) under the principle

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[20] Elgin Crossclose, "Diplomacy of Altruism," in Wiggins and Schoeck (eds.), op. cit., p. 34.

of national sovereignty and non-intervention in the internal affairs of others. The combination of these factors has placed the United States in the dubious position, in many areas, of appearing to support the "status quo." It has been most notable in those countries where the regime or government in power has opposed change, and has become immune to pressure (if not immune, at least physically capable of resisting internal demands for change). This condition has existed and should be acknowledged, not solely in a way of criticism, but more so in the light of political realities as they prevail in contemporary international relations. These situations must also be considered in the proper perspective with regard to feasible alternatives, realizing that the United States government, by its very presence or absence, may incite internal revolt in a troubled nation but cannot control such upheavals from an external position.

The relations between the United States and other nations has been, and will likely continue to be, on a government-to-government basis. By that is meant that the United States has not adopted the practice, common among the communist countries, of working to achieve political objectives through selected indigenous groups.[21]

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[21] Thomas Loeber, Foreign Aid: Our Tragic Experiment (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1961), pp. 83ff. Mr. Loeber, a former field worker under the old ICA organization, has delivered a scathing attack on United States foreign aid policy and program implementation. He was especially critical of United States government-to-government operations.

Some disadvantages inherent in this legalistic approach have become obvious, especially in those states where the need for change has existed, but the government has been successful in resisting it.

Altruism has long been a factor in United States foreign aid policy. While it has not been a primary one in the final analysis of the various programs, it has proved to be too significant a factor to be completely rejected in the designs of a realistic approach. It has produced a measure of the dichotomy in American policy, in that the policy-makers have relied heavily on the attractiveness of humanitarian principles in their efforts to enlist the greatest amount of support possible for foreign aid programs. The proponents of foreign aid have found that humanitarian interests, the national conscience, has probably resulted in the most effective natural foreign aid lobby ever to have functioned in the government. This influence will undoubtedly be felt so long as a foreign aid program is kept in existence. Only considerations of the direct national interest have prevailed over this factor; and the two have now become so enmeshed that their separation would seem unlikely.

A sizable portion of the United States foreign aid to the underdeloped nations in recent years has been in the form of military assistance.[22]

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[22] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Staff Memorandum, Foreign Assistance Authorizations and Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1962 and 1963, 87th Cong., 2d Sess., 26 October, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 2. In 1962, 1-6 of 3.92 billion was for military assistance; and in 1963 1.35 of 3.93 billion.

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[23] U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Mutual Assistance. Foreign Assistance Authorizations and Appropriations for Fiscal Years 1962 and 1963, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 26 October, 1961 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 2. In 1961, 1.6 of 3.2 billion was for military assistance; and in 1963 1. 12 of 3. 03 billion.

The amount of military assistance given to these countries has been determined through an intricate process of force level and defense analysis, and in a number of instances, represents the largest segment of foreign assistance from the United States to these countries. The military significance of aid given in the past was felt to be of such importance that it has been suggested that the Mutual Security Program prior to 1961 was purposely designed and presented in its selected format in order to maximize the amounts appropriated by Congress.[23] Prior to the installation of the present administration in office, the shift to economic assistance programs could be discerned, and a persistent, ever-increasing pressure in this direction has been in evidence.[24]

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[23] A letter to the President from eight members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, August 25, 1958, as cited in The President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Composite Report, (Reference Attachment), pp. 185-86. The letter from the Senators stated that "While we know you have had considerations of this kind in mind in preparing annual presentations of the Mutual Security Program, we believe that there may have been a tendency to believe that Congress blindly supports military assistance but looks with disfavor on economic assistance. . . .", p. 186.

[24] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Mutual Security Act of 1960, Report of Committee on S. 3058 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report No. 1286, April 22, 1960 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), pp. 4-5. A ceiling on military assistance to Latin America was imposed for the first time by the Congress. Initially, it was set at $55 million, and as reported by the Committee, it ". . . would have been disposed to make an even larger reduction except for the fact . . . [of] prior commitments.", p. 5.

As the possibility of a serious rift between the two leading communist powers has increased, and the chance for some form of agreement between Russia and the West has become less remote, the tendency to exercise even greater scrutiny over military assistance will have gained considerable support in the United States. The dissatisfaction among many members of the government, particularly the Congress, over the apparent refusal of the NATO countries to increase their defense expenditures to what the United States has considered minimal, cannot but add to the determination to decrease American defense assistance.[25]

The effect of military assistance in many areas has been as much a psychological factor as it has physically defensive. Any serious "reappraisals" of future programs, if they are to assist in the achievement of foreign policy objectives rather than create new problems, cannot ignore this heavy psychological element. It must be given sufficient weight in the final analysis regarding drastic

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[25]U. S. Congress, House of Representatives, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Conference Report, No. 2008, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., July 20, 1962 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), pp. 17-18. "The managers on the part of the House concurred in the position taken . . . that a more vigorous effort should be made to encourage those foreign governments which have attained a high level of prosperity to assume larger responsibility for the maintenance and equipment of their own military forces. They do not consider the provision to be inconsistent with the statement of policy . . . which urges the expansion of multilateral programs . . . particularly to further the defense of the North Atlantic area.", p. 17.

policy changes, since failure to do so would result in an even greater degree of international instability. Confident that such a factor has been fully considered in the past, this writer has referred to it in order to further substantiate his assumption that military assistance programs, while shifting in emphasis, have not been singled out for any drastic curtailment of such a nature that would invalidate the thesis.

"The problem here is not whether the development of democracy in other countries is desirable when the necessary preconditions exist," said Dr. Arnold Wolfers, ". . . but whether in the face of the Sino-Soviet threat the U. S. can afford to combat 'non-communist' [italics mine] autocratic governments in situations where the short-run results would be to weaken the military defenses against the Sino-Soviet threat."[26] Dr. Wolfers has stated that the name given to aid is not so important, but the use that it is put to that should govern United States actions.

In all the volumes of debate on the matter of foreign aid, two sets of relationships have led to all sorts of conclusions. The first is the economic/military aid factor, which has resulted in a competition between the two. The other is short-term/long-term objectives. From these, and the competitive approach which has developed

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[26] Walter F. Hahn and John C. Neff (eds.), loc. cit.

when considering them, Dr. Wolfers has raised two different questions:

> 1. Has the present struggle between the East and West changed in such a way that the short-run task of defense of the West has come to require more emphasis on economic and less, therefore, on military aid?
>
> 2. Has the present danger of the East-West struggle receded to a point where short-run defense efforts, whether military or economic, should give way to long-run efforts of economic development?[27]

This writer has answered both queries in the negative. From an elaboration on the reasons for the negative reply has evolved the the foreign aid policy upon which the subsequent Civic Action concept has been built.

The nature of the struggle between the East and West has changed, due primarily to the onset of the nuclear stalemate. The nature of the change, however, has not been such that it could have permitted the United States, in its own national interest, to lessen its emphasis on defense assistance, military or stability.[28] The expansionist tendency of the Soviet Union must be considered to be the determining factor in any evaluation of a foreign aid policy shift, since it has

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[27] Ibid., p. 378.

[28] Amos A. Jordan, Jr., Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 7 ff. The author has presented a comprehensive examination of the aspect of stability assistance, its various names and categories, and more specifically, its relationship to military assistance in the restricted sense.

been the basis for a major portion of the aid program from the beginning of the Marshall Plan to the present. The extension of Soviet control into the vulnerable southern portion of the Western hemisphere, and the increased intensity of disruptive activities in Southeast Asia (with indications that communist China, and not Soviet Russia, has gained the upper hand in guiding the direction of these movements) have added to the realization that economic development assistance alone could not stem the tide of internal revolution and chaos in these areas.

United States foreign aid has served politically useful purposes in the past, and there has been no reason to suspect that it could not be put to similar use in the future. Even the foreign aid antagonists, and the economic determinists have acknowledged the fact that there are political "facts of life" to be considered in the administration of such a program.

By resorting to the practice of cross-purposing aid, especially in the area of economic development assistance, there has developed the tendency on the part of the United States to "overshoot" or get ahead of the actual potential available in many of the underdeveloped countries. The absorptive capacity of some countries has been below the supply of capital available for long-term development projects.[29]

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[29] Barbara Ward Jackson, "Foreign Aid: Strategy or Stopgap?" Foreign Affairs, XLI, No. 1 (October, 1962), p. 94.

the supply of capital available for long-term investment.[37]

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[37] Barbara Ward, Jonathan Dupont, and Michael Stewart, Plan for Progress (London, 1961), p. 14.

There has been a general neglect of other factors in the social and cultural spheres which has proved to be contributing causes to development disappointments, and have had the effect of adding to the degree of instability within a developing country.[30] In aiming toward objectives which have been too advanced, or perhaps grandiose, the United States economic aid effort may have been impacting above the level of the sources of the problem.[31]

Professor Lucian Pye has stated that:

> American thinking seems to have a very optimistic outlook on the possibilities of rapid and significant change in the new countries. . . . At the deeper level American doctrine on foreign aid rests on an extremely sophisticated and complex image of the nature of human society. In a sense we are inclined to think of a society as being analogous to a complex machine with interconnecting parts so

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[30] U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Compilation of Studies on United States Foreign Policy, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., Study No. 12, by Center for International Studies, MIT, "Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and its Implications for United States Foreign Policy," II. pp. 1165-1268. This study emphasized the importance of balanced movement within a country, and the danger inherent in drawing generalizations about the levels of advancement in different areas. These generalizations have undoubtedly contributed to the problem of "overshoot," as this writer has dubbed it.

[31] John K. Galbraith, "A Positive Approach to Foreign Aid," Foreign Affairs, XXXIX, No. 3 (April, 1961), pp. 444-57. Ambassador Galbraith, in a pleading article, expressed the view that without a change in the United States concept of assisting in the progress of the underdeveloped countries, the nation's aid programs would continue to be disappointing. By citing case examples, he argued for more consideration in aid planning for those factors which make capital assistance effective. These were (1) literacy, (2) social justice (3) reliable apparatus for government and public administration, and (4) a clear sense of purpose of what development involves.

> that any movement or development in one part will be readily transmitted into the movements of the other parts.[32]

In comparing the conflicting moods in the American approach to foreign aid, he stated that:

> Americans have been the ones who talk the most about the revolution of rising expectations and the need to accomplish in one generation what the West took centuries to do. We are the ones who will not admit . . . that the great problem has been appalling apathy which often takes the form of undisciplined and blindly aggressive emotionalism.[33]

It would not appear presumptuous to assert that such moods found in the public mind in the United States will have undergone appreciable revision within the next decade.

American foreign aid policy has been set within a political framework, and there has been little indication that political considerations have lost their primacy when making judgments involving foreign aid. Increased opposition has placed restrictions on the outlay of military assistance funds. This condition can be expected to prevail until such time that there appears to be a serious threat to the physical integrity of the underdeveloped nations now receiving United States assistance. Outright grants of military assistance hardware to these countries will meet with progressively stiffer

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[32] Lucien W. Pye, "The Political Impulses and Fantasies Behind Foreign Aid," The Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVII, No. 2 (January, 1962), pp. 20-21.

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[32] Lucian W. Pye, "The Political Impulses and Restraints Behind Foreign Aid," The Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science, XXVII, No. 2 (January, 1962), pp. 20-21.

[33] Ibid.

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Economic development assistance, while gaining in prominence as the preferred method of rendering aid to the underdeveloped nations, will be subjected to more severe restrictions in terms of "hard" and "soft" loans, and loans in general as opposed to grants.[34] The conditions of eligibility, while not meeting the strict standards of the Millikan-Rostow approach, have become increasingly conservative.[35]

Prestige aid will continue to be relied upon, and will undoubtedly continue to serve a politically useful role. This factor, coupled with the elaborate and accelerated aims of the economic development programs will result in continued overshooting of the optimum impact area of aid in many of the least developed nations

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[34] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Background Material on Mutual Defense and Assistance Programs, 88th Cong., 12th Sess., April 26, 1963 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 12, 19. This booklet contains a compilation of tables, graphs, and charts, prepared by the Agency for International Development, with exceptions, for use by the Committee and The House during the FY 1964 aid deliberations. Appropriation trends are vividly apparent from the graphic presentations.

[35] George Champion, "Foreign Aid: A New Approach," Vital Speeches of the Day, XXIX, No. 6 (January 1, 1963), pp. 177-180. Mr. Champion, an influential banker, has exemplified the kind of pressure that has been brought to bear on the foreign aid program, and its association with political considerations to the point where, he has felt, economic considerations are completely ignored in aid negotiations.

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of Asia, Africa, and Latin America.

The Millikan-Rostow view, while not considered unacceptable, has left a political gap in the development process and has too lightly dismissed the short-run needs of peace and internal stability. The real dilemma has arisen in these areas from the fact that indigenous governments, while they have provided stability (maintained usually through physical force), have usually been the ones showing the greatest resistance to social and political change which would enhance economic development.[36] Mr. Henry Kissinger has expressed the opinion that

> . . . there is no country in which democratic institutions developed 'after' industrialization and 'as a result of' economic development. Where the rudiments of democratic institutions did not exist at the beginning of the industrial revolution, they did not receive impetus from industrial growth. . . . In all traditional societies, the essentials of the governmental system antedated the industrial revolution.[37]

The question has not been answered in this writing, but it has illustrated the complexity of the problem, especially when choices have had to be made regarding assistance and the type political system receiving it. In short, can the United States survive and

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[36] Zbigniew Brzezinski, "The Politics of Underdevelopment," World Politics, IX, (October, 1956), pp. 55-75. Mr. Brzezinski has taken the position that economic development now requires totalitarian control.

[37] Henry A. Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice: Prospects of American Foreign Policy (New York: Doubleday & Company, 1962), p. 301.

prosper in a world where democratic systems, of whatever variety or coloring, would be in a definite minority? Or, put differently, is there any avenue of approach which has not been exploited which would increase the possibility of influencing the underdeveloped nations, with all their social, economic, political, and cultural problems in such a way that stable, peaceful, democratic societies might evolve from the present confusion?

While the polemics continue, and the various proponents in their respective fields crusade for a specific approach to the problem, it has been assumed by this writer that the basic policy will not have changed to any significant degree. It will continue to be influenced by those factors described above, and the Civic Action concept has been developed within that framework.

CHAPTER III

THE RESURRECTION OF A CONCEPT

The United States, in an effort to achieve its overall foreign policy objectives, has turned recently to the Civic Action concept in foreign aid wherever possible. This "new" approach was not ushered in in a fit of innovative genius, and its applicability has been given credence in the example of the United States military forces utilization in the 19th and early 20th centuries.[1] Its success in this country, however, has not justified the universal application of Civic Action in each and every case in underdeveloped countries. Economic, social, and most importantly political and cultural differences evidenced in many of the underdeveloped states have demonstrated the need for extreme caution against the unqualified support of this concept in some instances.

The tendency in the United States toward completely embracing an idea once it has been appraised as an effective means to a larger end has given rise to the added danger of losing sight of the desired end. Civic Action, as interpreted by this writer, must be viewed in the proper perspective. That is, Civic Action, where applicable,

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[1] President's Committee to Study the United States Military Assistance Program, Supplement, Annex D, pp. 95-105.

might usefully serve as the necessary cohesive, unifying element (a means of bridging the gap) in many of the underdeveloped countries where its applicability has been and is being put to the test. To use programs of Civic Action for justifying larger indigenous military forces than would otherwise be considered necessary would be an instance where the purpose of this approach would be ill-served.[2] Equally damaging would be the use of the concept to meet the pressures which have been mounting within this country against further allocations of military assistance in areas where a "competitive" relationship has been developed, ideally or realistically, between the different kinds of foreign assistance. For purposes of clarity in the United States and for the edification of Congress, separate programs may be desirous. However, in an underdeveloped country there must be a consolidated approach to the problems of development and defense if optimum security and substantial progress is to be the rule, rather than the exception.

It has been in the atmosphere of the developing nation and its problems, within the overall framework of this writer's concept of prevailing United States foreign aid policy, that the concept--Civic Action--has been considered.

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[2] Kenneth W. Kennedy, "Civic Action as a Cold War Weapon," (Unpublished Student Thesis, U. S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, March, 1962), p. 11.

Definition

Section 501 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 declared that ". . . this part [Part II] may be called the International Peace and Security Act of 1961."[3] United States policy was promulgated, based on a recognition of the threat of communism to world peace, and on the belief that U.S. security is strengthened by the security of other free and independent countries. Military assistance was ". . . to furnish such countries co-operative assistance of a kind and in an amount reasonably designed to help them provide for their own security. . . ."[4]

Further provisions for military assistance were outlined in various other parts of the Act, one of which was Section 505. It stipulated that military assistance under the provisions of the Foreign Assistance Act should be used to ". . . encourage the participation by the military forces of the less developed countries in programs designed to foster economic development."[5] It was through these

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[3] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Report of Committee on S. 1983, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., Report No. 612, July, 1961, p. 24.

[4] Ibid.

[5] It should be noted that this statement of policy guidance was not an innovation peculiar to the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. The Mutual Security Act of 1954 contained essentially the same statement in Section 105 (b), (5), which read ". . . administrators of military assistance programs shall encourage the use of foreign military forces in underdeveloped countries in the construction of public works and other activities helpful to economic development."

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

provisions of the various foreign aid bills enacted into law that provided a legal basis upon which the administrators of foreign aid have further expanded the concept currently referred to as Civic Action.

Civic Action has been officially defined as

> . . . an aspect of civil affairs . . . any function performed by military forces in co-operation with civil authorities, agencies, or groups, through the use of military manpower and material resources for the socio-economic well-being and improvement of the civil community with a goal of building or reinforcing mutual respect and fellowship between the civil and military communities.[6]

Civil Affairs, referred to in the above definition, has been used to define the relationship between the military commander and civil authorities of a specific area where military forces are present.[7] The latter may be considered to be broader in scope, and Civic Action as but one segment of that broad relationship.

The Civic Action concept has been defined and redefined, and has been burdened more recently with the additional descriptive adjective--"military"--in an effort to better clarify that particular aspect of United States foreign aid policy.[8]

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[6] Department of the Army, Field Manual (FM41-10), Civil Affairs Operations (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Army, May, 1962), p. 83.

[7] Ibid., p. 3.

[8] Civil Affairs Office, USMACV, Vietnam, Extracts From Civil Affairs School; Special Text 41-10-80, 10 December, 1962, pp. 5-10.

[illegible] of the various foreign aid units involved but [illegible] pro-
vided a legal basis which the administrators of foreign aid have
sought. Appendix One contains currently effective legislation.

Clause [illegible] has been definitely defined as

. . . to support civil military . . . any function pert-
[illegible] by military forces in cooperation with civil
authorities, especially in times, through use of mili-
tary manpower and material resources for the relief
[illegible] resulting from disasters of the civil economy
with a goal of building-up nation-wide mutual support and
fully orderly conversion for civil and military readiness.[6]

Civil defense, conceived in its most narrow definition, has been used
to define the relationship between the military establishment and civil
authority in a populace upon whom military force was present.[7]

The latter may be considered to be broader in scope and style. Defense
is that area [illegible] that beyond civil duties.

The Civil Defense concept has been defined and redefined, and
has been harmonized relatively with the [illegible] foreign
[illegible]. Position papers on civil defense are [illegible] from partici-
pants of United States foreign aid policy.[8]

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[6] Department of the Army, Field Manual [illegible]: Civil Affairs Operations (Washington: Headquarters, U.S. Army, June 1962), p. 61.

[7] Ibid., p. 3.

[8] Civil Defense (Office, Director, Technical Services Civil Defense Planning Advisory Council Task [illegible], 19 September, 1962, pp. 3-
19).

Major General William B. Rosson, USA, author of several articles dealing with the subject of Civic Action, has expressed dismay at the apparent general misunderstanding of this important aspect of foreign aid. His feelings have not been ill-founded, as was evidenced in his statement that ". . . such questions kept popping up as to whose military was involved, what does the military actually do in the Civic Action function? Or, doesn't AID handle economic development assistance?"[9]

The General provided a working definition of Civic Action for further clarification, which stated that it

> . . . involves the use of preponderantly 'indigenous' military forces on projects useful to the 'local' population at all levels in such fields as education, training, public works, agriculture, transportation, communications, public health, sanitation, and others 'contributing' to economic and social development, which would also serve to 'improve' the standing of the military forces with the population. (U.S. forces may at times advise or actually engage in Civic Action activities in overseas areas.)[10]

Part of the confusion has also been attributed to the fact that ". . . while the activity 'per se' is as old as warfare, the specific designation, 'Civic Action,' is of relatively recent vintage and is a coined term."[11]

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[9] William B. Rosson, "Understanding Civic Action," Army XIII, No. 12, July, 1963, pp. 46-48.

[10] Ibid., p. 47.

[11] William R. Swarm, Col., USA, "Civic Action," a speech delivered before the annual conference of the Military Government Association, Hartford, Connecticut, June 15, 1962. Reprinted in The Congressional Record, Vol. 108, No. 140, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., August 10, 1962, p. 2.

The general tendency in the United States has been to perceive of Civic Action as a much larger program than strictly military Civic Action. Such interpretations have resulted in the acceptance of the notion that military Civic Action has been established merely as a segment of the overall development approach to a recipient country, which has been referred to simply as Civic Action. As the concept has been defined, this could not be the case. Civic Action and military Civic Action could be used as interchangable terms when the reference has been correctly adduced.

> In responding to a request for assistance . . . The U.S. offers the country concerned a variety of plans designed to promote its national integrity. . . . One feature of this coordinated planning is the rendering of assistance designed to enable certain native military forces to contribute to social and economic advancement, particularly in the remote or insurgency-ridden regions where there may be no civil agencies. Whether we call this activity 'Civic Action' or 'Military Civic Action' is unimportant. . . . The important thing to realize is that military skills offer an additional means by which local governments can win the hearts and minds of its people by demonstrating a concern for their welfare and an ability to improve it.[12]

The activities of other groups--the United Nations, the Agency for International Development, and various private organizations--have included similar operations, and all have been aimed at the long-run objective of economic development and modernization. The programs of these latter organizations could not be considered as falling

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[12] William H. Rosson, op. cit., p. 47.

within the concept of Civic Action, and if such classification were insinuated, it would surely meet with strenuous opposition and resistance. The association of the prime factor of Civic Action--the military--with these other endeavors would have the effect of detracting from what could be considered to be the prime salutary feature of these types of assistance--the fact that they are divorced from military connotations.

The concept of Civic Action has been mis-construed for many reasons, not the least of which has been the recent adoption of the term. Community development, a term used to describe a specific approach in the assistance of a nation, and one which has gained considerable recognition recently, has been the process with which Civic Action has become most commonly confused. This method of assistance has not been specifically concerned with military forces. It has been defined by the United Nations

> . . . as the process by which the efforts of the people themselves are united with the governmental authorities to improve economic, social, and cultural conditions of communities, to integrate these communities into the life of the nation, and to enable them to contribute fully to national progress.[13]

There has been no specific mention of the military forces in the above definition of community development. The reason for the confusion between the two has arisen from the otherwise similar nature

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[13] United Nations, Community Development and Economic Development (New York: United Nations Publications, 1960), p. 1.

[illegible] [illegible] [illegible] [

of the approaches to development. The two definitions, as stated, have revealed similarities, but Civic Action has been identifiable by such characteristics as:

1. Civic Action projects are performed by military forces, whereas community development is carried out principally by other government agencies.

2. There has been a distinct rapport sought through joint civil-military co-operation characteristic of the Civic Action approach which is not peculiar to the community development idea.

3. Civic Action was initiated to gain utilization of military manpower, equipment, facilities, organization, and resources where other agencies (the United Nations, private organizations) would not command the use of these services.[14]

The central facet of Civic Action and its application in the field of foreign aid has been the military establishment of the underdeveloped nation. The adoption of the concept has not been one of entirely positive action, and the ability of these programs to meet the changing nature of the threat to the independence and internal security of the underdeveloped world has revealed a reactionary characteristic of the approach. The new twist of Civic Action in United States foreign aid policy has taken hold, however, and these activities have been extended to twenty-five

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[14] William R. Swarm, op. cit., p. 3.

[illegible]

countries in the Far East, Middle East, and Latin America.[15]

Although Civic Action has been the proud heritage of many armies throughout the world, and most appropriately the United States Army, its inherent potential has only recently been fully realized. The popularity and applicability of this concept have increased significantly since the commencement of the so-called Decade of Development and establishing of objectives it contains. Part of the newly-found importance of Civic Action could be attributed to the changing military strategy of the present Administration from one of massive retaliation and containment through alliances to what has been referred to as the strategy of "flexible response."[16] This shifting strategy has been adopted for the purpose of meeting and countering more effectively the communist practice of lending maximum support to "wars of national liberation."[17] This shift still reflects a policy reactive in nature since the programs have not changed drastically, but have merely undergone a change in emphasis in this writer's opinion. The United States has become aware of its role in the underdeveloped

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[15] Robert B. Slover, Col., USA, "This is Military Civic Action," Army, XIII, No. 12, July 1963, p. 48.

[16] U. S. Congress, House, Committee on Armed Services, op. cit., p. 288.

[17] Roger Hilsman, "Internal War: The New Communist Tactic," in T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla--and How to Fight Him (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 22-36.

countries, and has acknowledged the fact that these areas have become exposed to political, socio-economic, and psychological pressures which in many instances have exceeded the actual threat of military aggression.[18] It has also become apparent that internal security and political stability within these countries have become more dependent upon efforts toward easing the principal sources of pressure, and less upon a guarantee of protection from the possibility of external aggression.[19]

There have been several factors in United States relations with other states which have gained a new significance since the inception of the concept of Civic Action in American foreign aid policy. Such things as the lack of political democracy in the recipient countries, supporting dictatorships with military assistance, and the resistance of the recipient governments to agree to needed reform have proved to be most perplexing. Civic Action, by virtue of the fact that it has be designed to strengthen the position of the indigenous military forces, increase the social awareness of the masses, enhance the development of local government, and add to the general effectiveness of the pressure which might be applied at the national level, has only added to the pitfalls of this approach. The risk involved, however, could

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[18] U. S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, The Foreign Assistance Act of 1963, Hearings before the Committee, 88th Cong., 1st Session, on S. 1276, June 13 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1963), p. 175.

[19] Ibid.

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[illegible]

not be lessened or removed by the neglect of such programs, and the fact that change has been initiated and cannot be feasibly retarded has dictated that the United States support such an approach as the one which would best serve its own national interest.[20]

Applicability

The Civic Action concept has been based on the assumption that the indigenous military forces of the less-developed countries, in most instances, would provide a valuable source of manpower, training, and organization for the implementation of the desired programs. There has been at the same time a growing realization among experts that action was needed within the underdeveloped areas at the "grass-roots" level of the society. The need for such action was considered with a view toward accomplishing two steps deemed essential in these areas if further development were to proceed in the expected fashion, and evolve peacefully.[21]

First, there has been a growing imbalance within the underdeveloped countries between the rural, or community oriented pro-

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[20]Frank Tannenbaum, "Considerations for the Latin American Policy," in James Roosevelt (ed.), The Liberal Papers (New York: Anchor Books, Doubleday & Co., 1962), pp. 278-81.

[21]Melvin M. Tumin, "Some Social Requirements for Effective Community Development," (A background paper for the Conference on Community Development, Princeton University, December 13-15, 1957), pp. 29-30.

grams, and those of an industrial, or urbanized nature.[22] This disparity has led to conditions of unrest, especially where the rural populations have immigrated to the urban areas, only to find that the cities have been unable to absorb them and completely satisfy their aspirations. The Civic Action programs have been specifically aimed at those rural communities for the purpose of creating more stable conditions, and minimally satisfying the needs of the inhabitants of that level of the society. This has not been the sole appeal of the Civic Action concept, but the adaptability of this approach to that type problem has contributed to its growing acceptance, especially in the recent past when rural tranquility has not been a characteristic of nations suffering from internal instability.[23]

Secondly, there has always been the effort in foreign aid programs of a development assistance nature to create or further develop those basic prerequisites needed for sustained advancement and growth within the recipient countries. That is, the basic requirements of power, transportation, communications, and education have been stressed so as to provide a base for further, and more rapid progress in the drive toward modernization. By attacking the problem in the underdeveloped nations in a way which would provide for stability and a base for

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[22]United Nations, Aspects of Economic Development (New York: U. N. Office of Public Information, Study No. 8, no date), p. 30.

[23]Special Operations Research Office, American University, Special Warfare Area Handbook for Colombia (Washington: Department of the Army, 1961), pp. 273-277.

areas, and those of an industrial, or urbanized nature.[22] This disparity has led to conditions of unrest, especially where the rural populations have immigrated to the urban areas, only to find that the cities have been unable to absorb them and completely satisfy their aspirations. The Civic Action programs have been specifically aimed at these rural communities for the purpose of creating more stable conditions, and minimally satisfying the needs of the inhabitants of this level of the society. This has not been the sole appeal of the Civic Action concept, but the adaptability of this approach to that type problem has contributed to its growing acceptance, especially in the recent past when rural tranquility has now been a characteristic of nations suffering from internal instability.[23]

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[22] United Nations, Aspects of Economic Development (New York: U. N. Office of Public Information, Study No. 6, no date), p. 39.

[23] Special Operations Research Office, American University, Special Warfare Area Handbook for Colombia (Washington: Department of the Army, 1963), pp. 272-277.

further progress, the United States has put to use a vehicle which holds considerable potential in the field of foreign aid.[24]

The use of a national institution--the military--to effect these basic changes has added to the attractiveness of Civic Action in the respect that it has represented, in many instances, the only stable symbol of nationhood which has proved effective in transcending the obstacles of sectional and regional allegiances.[25]

Further impetus was provided for the concept of Civic Action by the late President Kennedy in December, 1961, when he expressed the feeling before the National Security Council which indicated that the United States might not be doing enough in this field.[26] A National Security Council Action Memorandum originating from that meeting defined three specific situations in which Civic Action would be particularly useful in achieving overall foreign policy objectives.

1. In countries fighting active campaigns against internal subversion, civic action is an indispensable means of strengthening the economic base and establishing a link between the armed forces and the populace.

2. In countries threatened by external aggression, forces should participate in military civic action projects which do not materially impair performance of the primary military mission.

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[24] Jay H. Cerf and Walter Pozen, op. cit., pp. 145-48.

[25] Michael Edwardes, Asia in the Balance (Baltimore: Penguin Books, Inc., 1962), pp. 169-75.

[26] Statement by Major-General William B. Rosson, USA, in a speech delivered to The Interdepartmental Committee, Washington, D. C., October, 1962, p. 5.

> 3. In countries where subversion or external attack is less imminent, selected indigenous military forces can contribute substantively to economic and social development, and such a contribution can be a major function of these forces.[27]

The recent emphasis on self-help in development projects has also added to the intrinsic worth of the concept. The 1961 address of President Kennedy to the Congress on foreign aid specifically mentioned the fact that special attention would have to be directed to the self-help aspects of any aid given by the United States.[28] Within the United States Army measures have been taken which accentuate this principle. Mobile Civic Action teams have been formed for the purpose of rendering assistance to projects of a self-help nature, primarily, in that these teams have not been permanently assigned to any one particular country. The technical qualifications of the various teams differs markedly also, which has further added to their flexibility and mobility.[29] The mobile team approach was designed to provide "trouble-shooting" services to the various military missions within the recipient countries, and they have not been dispatched except when specifically requested by the Ambassador concerned. Even then,

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[27] Ibid. The Memorandum referred to was National Security Action Memorandum No. 119, December, 1961, which was specifically mentioned in the speech, but was unavailable to the writer supposedly for security reasons.

[28] U. S. Government, Department of State Bulletin, XLVI, No. 1137 (April 10, 1961), p. 507.

[29] United States Army, Civil Affairs School, Standing Operating Procedures for Civic Action Teams, n.d., pp. 5-12.

the teams remain in an area only for that period of time required to meet the needs of the country and the MAAG confronted with problems of a Civic Action nature.[30]

Civic Action operations have been generally classified either by the level of direction and/or the security situation of the area under consideration. The level of direction classification has had to do primarily with the source of initiative resulting in the Civic Action project, whether it was generated from a national plane or resulted from a voluntary scheme on the local level aimed at community improvement. The importance of this classification can be appreciated when consideration for overall country development has been established as the long-run objective. Consistent with that objective, there has often arisen a need for a determination as to whether local projects should be undertaken which, upon their completion, have added little or nothing to overall national development.

Projects which have been considered at the local level, and have been found to be of negative value as far as national development is concerned, have presented a dilemma. The question which then must be resolved is whether or not such a project, and the associated costs, could be justified politically. Many local projects have resulted in social betterment of the community, and generally have served to satisfy

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[30] Ibid.

a particular need of the people in the area. Such has not always been the case with centrally controlled projects. There have been times when local programs, regardless of national benefit, have proved worthy of the cost, which has brought up the second classification.[31]

Civic Action projects which have been designed for areas where there is political unrest, minimum governmental organization, or actual insurgency operations in progress have demanded special consideration. Obviously, the long-run objective of national development must necessarily be relegated to a position of secondary importance. The advantages of local projects with regard to relative cost, greater local participation, and in the case of Civic Action works, closer association of the local populace with the military forces would far outweigh the singular disadvantage of negative value toward national development. In many cases conditions have been in such upheaval in these areas that anything other than local Civic Action operations would have resulted in complete failure economically, socially, and politically.[32]

The close association of Civic Action and counter-insurgency has come to light through a consideration of this latter classification. As has been mentioned earlier, the nature of the threat facing the

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[31] United States Army, Civil Affairs School, Civic Action and Community Programming, No. 4413/1, (September, 1962), pp. LF-20-22. (Prepared by Capt. Richard Layfield, USA, Fort Gordon, Georgia.)

[32] Ibid.

United States on the international scene has taken shape in the form of guerrilla warfare, and the task confronting this nation has been to attempt, where practicable, to remove the source of unrest. To expect that Civic Action operations alone could accomplish such a task would be totally unrealistic, but to assert that they have no utility would be equally foolish.

The internal situation in any recepient country must be considered when determining the applicability of any Civic Action operation. Situations which have degenerated to such a degree that active military operations have been undertaken to counter guerrilla activity have been designated active areas. Operations presently in progress in Vietnam have exemplified this condition. Passive areas might be considered to be in existence in several regions throughout the world, especially in Latin America. That is, periodic or consistent breakdowns in internal security have not been considered commonplace, but pressures have been such that corrective action could not long be delayed without serious consequences.

The essential difference between these areas, and the application of Civic Action to them, has been further clarified by the use of the terms "curative" and "preventive." In the former, conditions have usually deteriorated to such a state that local civilians in the infested areas of a nation have been almost totally concerned with survival, rather than loyalty and support for the national government. In these areas, the principal task of the military forces has been combat

operations and protection of the people, and not so much assistance in local development. In short, Civic Action has been supplanted by a more critical requirement. Such situations have revealed what might be considered to be an inherent weakness in the applicability of Civic Action. But when one has viewed internal situations in a different light, a new urgency has been given to the need for furthering such programs in the many areas of the world where the situation has not as yet progressed to the active stage, and preventive measures could still prove effective. W. W. Rostow, in an address to the graduating class at the U. S. Army Special Warfare School at Fort Bragg, stated that:

> We can learn to prevent the emergence of the famous sea in which Mao Tse-tung taught his men to swim. This requires, of course, not merely a proper military program of deterrence but programs of village development, communications, and indoctrination. The best way to fight a guerrilla war is to prevent it from happening. And this can be done.[33]

At the time of the above statement, Mr. Rostow was serving as Deputy Special Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. Such a statement, from a person in that position, might be interpreted readily as a substantial endorsement of the concept of Civic Action as it applies to United States military strategy today.

Civic Action has not been envisioned as a substitute for military

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[33] W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in Underdeveloped Areas," Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 49.

power, but an integral part of it. This relationship has been most readily exemplified in those areas of active counterinsurgency. As stated in a recent article published by the Department of Defense, " . . . As the interdependence of civil and military matters is increasingly recognized, the social and economic welfare of the people can no longer be considered a non-military concern."[34] In those areas which could be classified as passive, this has been the principal task of the military. Their efforts have been directed toward the economic and social betterment of the communities concerned.

The realization of the objectives of Civic Action has been dependent upon the impact it has had on the people concerned, and the degree of association and allegiance to the national government extracted from them. The support, loyalty, and identification of the people with the military has been the measuring device in this determination, since the military in these regions has been the representative of the national government.

What state, who would beget the "status" of a state, would be without a military establishment? The essence of that question could not be meaningful except in terms of the present day feelings of the various leaders of the states constituting the international community. Applied to the concept of Civic Action, it means that the vehicle chosen

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[34] U. S. Government, Department of Defense, "Civic Action: The Military Role in Nation Building," This Changing World, III, No. 14 (January 15, 1964), p. 1.

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[14] U.S. Constitution, Impeachment of Judges, Article III, Sec. 1: "The judges, both of the supreme and inferior courts, shall hold their offices during good behavior, ..." This Clearing House, III, No. 12 (January 15, 1964), p. 1.

for the implementation of the concept would be practically universally available. The military establishments of many of the underdeveloped nations have provided an element of the society which has contained the most effective leadership, the most highly trained labor force, and the best organization to be found in those areas.[35] Such has not been the entire story concerning the role the military could play in the underdeveloped areas, however, and there have been problems of a larger and more politically significant nature which have merited consideration.

Has there been any relationship between the growing use of military Civic Action and the increasing tendency toward military "coups" in the underdeveloped countries? If so, how has this affected United States foreign policy, and how would an affirmative relationship be accepted by the American people, in view of the fact that military governments have not met with resounding accolades in this country. Also, has not the assistance rendered to the local communities in the underdeveloped areas through voluntary programs not sponsored by the national government concerned led to great factionalism? Or, have Civic Action undertakings, while bringing about conditions of socio-economic betterment, only caused the internal political situation to become more confused and unstable?

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[35] Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1962), pp. 20-22.

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[15] Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of New States," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1962), pp. 20-21.

With these questions in mind, the writer has turned his attention to the problem areas involved in the Civic Action approach to foreign aid, and the subject of the recipient state.

CHAPTER IV

PROBLEM AREAS IN CIVIC ACTION

The Civic Action concept, as outlined previously, has no newly-found formula for insuring success. It is not the long sought after panacea. Neither will it adapt to any and all circumstances which could be encountered by the United States government in implementing a vast foreign assistance program. The concept does, nevertheless, provide some method of approaching a great many of the international situations in foreign aid where other types of political maneuvering have failed to yield successful results. In fact, the civic action concept may yet prove to be a workable method of achieving results where others have not only not been successful, but have been marked as dismal failures as far as the United States national interest has been concerned.

In order to achieve a relatively limited, yet comprehensive study of what has constituted the greatest problem sources in civic action, and also to remain as close to the heart of the subject as possible, the writer has chosen to discuss these problems within the context of (1) the recipient government, (2) the masses of the recipient nation, and (3) the indigenous military forces. Necessarily, the relationships between these elements and corresponding ones in the United States have been included, since the source of some problems have been found in

CHAPTER IX

POSSIBILITIES AND LIMITS OF CIVIC ACTION

those relationships.

By reference to actual experience, there has perhaps arisen the fallacy of extracting theoretical generalizations from isolated actual cases. The writer has made a conscious effort to avoid such a pitfall, and has resorted to such generalities only in those areas where it has become more or less universally accepted. For example, it has not been considered erroneous to assume that political leaders of nations have been influenced in their actions by an innate desire or liking for power and prestige. Similarly, the basis of individual revolutionary fervor in the underdeveloped world has been found to be less among those whose stomachs are empty and are living in the depths of squalor and despair than among those who have seen or tasted a spattering of the better things in life.[1] (It is true, however, that the majority of the masses of the world are to be found in the latter classification.)

The Recipient Government

United States foreign aid, in whatever form, has been extended to nearly every nation in the world since the end of the Second World War.[2] A program with practically universal operation has shown

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[1] James Eliot Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (New York: Doubleday & Co., Inc., 1963), p. 20.

[2] The Clay Report, March 20, 1963.

in past years that universally applicable guidelines, when adopted for use, have confused issues more often than they have aided the implementation of the program.

The fact that no two nations are exactly alike would suffice to explain the above statement, but similarity in all other aspects except the specific government and its method of ruling would be sufficient reason to dispell any thought of applying governing principles of a general nature to foreign assistance.

The government of a recipient nation must, in the first instance, be in a position to receive assistance in a form which would be compatible with what would be needed to establish, and successfully implement, a civic action type program. A basic fact, and one which has probably been conveniently overlooked by many critics of foreign aid in general has been that of the sovereignty of states, and the political independence of the governments representing those states. Irregardless of the credence anyone would place in the validity of this aspect of sovereignty, and the political freedom resulting therefrom, a perplexing problem has resulted when programs of Civic Action have been encouraged by the United States but not desired by the recipient government. The power of suggestion has proved useful, but has never been considered decisive. The alternatives to a strong-minded recipient government are few. Assistance may be proffered on a compromising basis, or it may not be rendered at all.

In most instances, since the recipient governments have been afforded bargaining alternatives by other aid-producing groups, the choice of compromise has been the most appropriate, generally.[3]

The government of an underdeveloped recipient nation must be intimately understood with respect to its aims, where it gets its majority support, and what kind and how much control it has been given, or has been able to gain, over the country. A dictatorship, with absolute control, poses minimal problems in so far as understanding where the crux of national power has been vested. In an underdeveloped state with a dictatorial regime, however, the benefits of a Civic Action program have not been considered very attractive. There would be no great benefit derived from a strengthening of the local elements of the government, nor would a closer "rapport" between the military forces and the masses be considered beneficial where a coalition of the two would present control problems for the dictator. States controlled in the above manner, and also infected with subversive and guerrilla elements, have taken assistance, but have generally delayed any form of Civic Action operation with a view toward

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[3] U. S. Congress, Senate, United States Foreign Policy, Compilation of Studies 9-13, Committee of Foreign Relations, 86th Cong., 2nd Sess., Vol II, September, 1960, Study No. 12 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1960), p. 1173. This study, entitled "Economic, Social, and Political Change in the Underdeveloped Countries and its implications for U. S. Foreign Policy," conducted by The Center for International Studies, MIT, has referred to this phenomenon as "the strategy of third choice."

removing the infection first, and then effecting reforms at some time yet to come when the situation would be considered less critical. The usual outcome in such instances has been the collapse or overthrow of that regime before the time for implementing Civic Action has ever been considered appropriate.[4]

Stability in government has been an additional problem with which the United States has had to contend when dealing in foreign assistance. It has not been too surprising that many of the newer states have had some difficulty in maintaining an acceptable degree of stability in their attempts to make a majority government function.

> As people associate independence with an immediate improvement of their standard of living, there must be vigorous economic developments which are bound to affect the whole structure of life down to the level of the simplest farmers and pastoralists.
>
> Small wonder that some of the new untried constitutions have buckled under the strain of conducting so many operations at once, at the same time trying to maintain civil liberties, conduct free elections, and attempt government by debate. They have had to do this while allowing attacks of an opposition not yet fully schooled in political moderation, and based, perhaps less on party principle than upon regionalism or religion. In some countries, faced with the weakness of new constitutional government, the one irresistible authority--the Army--has taken power.[5]

Likewise, in an economic sense, government instability sometimes has been the result of the leaders attempting to do what they

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[4] James Elliot Cross, loc. cit.

[5] Margery Perham, "Political and Psychological Aspects of Development," Restless Nations (New York: Dodd & Mead and Co., Council on World Tensions, 1962), pp. 22-23.

Council on World Tensions, 1962), pp. 22-27.

have considered best for the country.

> In a poor society, both production and consumption are so low that not only is the gap between the two infinitesimal, but any increase in production tends to get absorbed by increased consumption unless corrective measures are applied to hold consumption in check. In a free society, in which the rulers are freely chosen by the masses of the people, no government has a chance of continuing in office if it fails to satisfy, in however small measure it may be, the urge for an immediate increase in consumption.[6]

In other areas, such as Latin America, an oligarchy form of rule in government has had an adverse effect on the United States endeavors in most instances. The prime attractiveness of such governments for the United States has been their violently strong anti-communist philosophies. Such positions by these groups, however, have been the basis for problems of another kind.

> Our dilemma in relation to military aid and internal subversion . . . is the difficulty in distinguishing genuine native movements from alien communist infiltration. This becomes more serious since in some cases the communists have prostituted and taken over worthy causes to serve their own ends. . . . There is considerable danger that our military aid will be used not only to combat communism, but also to suppress legitimate progressive movements and/or to maintain one group in power. . . . Trends indicate that the traditional elite . . . are on their way out as an effective political force. If we allow our military aid to support this group under the blanket of combatting communism, we may find ourselves identified with this group, and consequently by implication the enemies of future successors to political power.[7]

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[6] Thomas P. Peardon (ed.), The New Look in Foreign Aid (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1962), pp. 53-54.

[7] Norman D. Palmer, "The Impact of Foreign Aid," Current History, Vol. 33, No. 192, (September, 1957), p. 148.

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In a poor country, both production and consumption are so low that one may in the gap between the two individuals, but any increase in production tends to get absorbed by increased consumption unless corrective measures are applied to hold consumption in check. In a free society, in which the rulers are freely chosen by the masses of the people, no government has a chance of continuing in office if it fails to satisfy, in however small measure it may be, the urge for an immediate increase in consumption.[6]

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[6] Thomas P. Peardon (ed.), The Inter-American System (New York: Columbia U. Press, 1962), pp. 13-14.

[7] Norman D. Palmer, "The Impact of Foreign Aid," Current History, Vol. 33, No. 194, (September, 1957), p. 138.

The problem of communication among the various levels of society within a country ruled in the above fashion has caused considerable concern for those endeavoring to institute a civic action program.

> In addition to modern central government organization, rapid development in these societies requires effective links between the political and economic center and the masses of the people in the villages and on the farms. Creating or revitalising these links is generally recognized to be one of the essential development tasks of government. The community development schemes . . . are an effort to provide an institutional framework to permit and encourage the peasant masses to contribute to development.[8]

The task has proved to be more than a mere establishment of institutions. It has been one of convincing the people who have become the object of this inducement by the government that there are benefits to be had, and that the programs proposed have some degree of attainability.[9] The attitudes toward change displayed in the underdeveloped lands have favored more of a slow, minor, beneficient type, associated with works that have reflected mass betterment. These have proved to be less prone to create or result in violent rebellion and gross instability than have those of questionable benefit at some future point in time.[10]

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[8] Amos A. Jordan, Foreign Aid and the Defense of Southeast Asia (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), p. 179.

[9] Eugene R. Black, The Diplomacy of Economic Development (Cambridge: Harvard U. Press, 1960), p. 120.

[10] Ibid.

[12] Ibid.

The above comparison of project types, and the general tendency of recipient governments to select the "future benefit" ones (not necessarily for the benefit to be derived, but perhaps more so for the prestige value connected with them) has given birth to the phrase "jumping the gap." The gap, economically, has generally been construed to mean that period of development from a primitive stage to a point beyond which economic growth, with sufficient outside assistance, could be fostered and maintained.[11] This practice of so-called jumping the gap, which has become commonplace among the underdeveloped nations, has introduced one of the more serious impediments to the effective implementation of a civic action program, or any other assistance venture.[12] A national airline, with all the latest jet aircraft and required associated costly paraphernalia, in lieu of a better system of internal transportation for the movement of people, goods, and services has been an example which has brought this problem vividly to the public mind.

Actions by recipient governments of a political nature in international organizations have often severely restricted the degree of

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[11] Lucian W. Pye, "The Social and Political Implications of Community Development," Community Development Review, Vol. 5, (December, 1960), pp. 11-21. The "gap," as interpreted by the author in the political sense, is the void between the national government and the rural masses.

[12] Dr. James Blume, "Lending and its Limitations," Aid Digest, (June, 1962), p. 35.

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[11] Lucian W. Pye, "The Social and Political Dysfunctions of Community Development," Community Development Journal, Vol. 3, (October, 1968), pp. 11-21. The "gap" as interpreted by the author is the political space, or the void between the national government and the rural masses.

[12] Dr. Dennis Gilson, "Leading and Its Limitations," Ind Digest, June, 1962), p. 32.

flexibility available to the United States government in rendering any kind of assistance. The people involved in these operations in gover.- ment have not been able to act with immunity from internal pressures emanating from the actions of a recipient government. Independent, and often indiscreet actions by governments receiving assistance which have involved those areas of vital interest to the United States have severely restricted the latter's ability, and in some instances, its willingness to meet "bona fide" recipient needs.[13]

The still-simmering dispute between Panama and the United States has vivified yet another problem area with recipient governments. That is, in the internal political machinations of the various parties or groups, all have found it advantageous to place the United States involvement or presence in the forefront as a major election campaign issue. This practice, in itself, has not always had an undesirable effect; but, when the United States itself has become a negative issue, and it has been subjected to vilification and ridicule irregardless of its position, right or wrong, strained relations have inevitably ensued. In short, the practice of using the United States and its policies as a football in what has been analagous to a national political "punting" contest has not been enjoyed by the government or people of this nation.[14]

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[13] Hubert H. Humphery, "I Vote 'Aye' for India," Aid Digest, (July, 1962), pp. 15-16.

[14] Time, Vol. 83, No. 6 (February 7, 1964), pp. 38, 41; Vol. 83, No. 9 (February 28, 1964), p. 42.

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[15] Hubert H. Humphrey, "I Vote 'Aye' for India," Look Digest, (July, 1962), pp. 15-16.

[16] Time, Vol. 83, No. 6 (February 7, 1964), pp. 36, 40; Vol. 83, No. 9 (February 28, 1964), p. 40.

The Masses of the Recipient Nation

The Civic Action concept has been pointedly directed toward the individual. The principal guideline or parameter for measuring a successful civic action undertaking has been the degree of association and allegiance extracted from the individual toward the military, hence the national government. The importance of achieving the maximum degree of support from the masses for the government can be fully appreciated only when it has been realized that therein is contained the essence of the struggle. Theorists on the art of guerrilla warfare, without exception, have stated categorically that without the co-operation and support, or at least a passive and/or indifferent attitude of the masses, a guerrilla operation has been foredoomed to failure.[15] The chief attractiveness of Civil Action has been couched in that very theorem of guerrilla war. Civic Action, too, has been destined to fail in terms of positive achievement where its advocates have neglected to gain the support and assistance of the people it was designed to help.

Since the masses have been the focus of these two diametrically opposed approaches--Civic Action and Guerrilla Warfare--a closer look at this focal point has been taken.

The element of change, and mass reaction to that change, has made the challenge of gaining the support of the people so essential.

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[15] Samuel B. Griffith, Brig. Gen., USMC (ret.), Mao Tse Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961), p. 42.

> Social, political, and economic change are taking place in the underdeveloped countries. What form these changes take we cannot be sure, but we can be sure they will affect the United States greatly. And we can be sure that what we do or do not do can greatly influence these changes and the course they take.[16]

The basic fact that change has been occurring, or the fact that the majority of the peoples in the world have become aware of possible changes for the better, has become generally accepted. This phenomenon has been collared with the phrase "revolution of rising expectations," and its use has caused the term to approach becoming another "cliche." What has more appropriately described the conditions in many areas of the world has been the phrase 'frustrations of rising aspirations." The result of these frustrations has been political unrest in those areas where economic and social conditions have not been regarded as favorable among the inhabitants. This unrest has taken the form of revolts, general upheaval, and, where the proper elements have been able to infiltrate, guerrilla and subversive activity. Its origin can be traced, in the majority of instances, to mass discontent, frustration, and disappointment.

> Feelings of satisfaction and dissatisfaction with economic conditions are influenced not only by what one has and expects to have, but also by what one wants to have. This fact has largely been ignored by the Western world where aspirations are high and tend to grow with income, so that small increments of income do not appreciably affect the two. But in countries

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[16] U.S. Congress, Senate, Compilation of Studies 9-13, op. cit., p. 1171.

> where the masses have never experienced high levels of living, where evidence of alternatives to present conditions and the concept of economic progress itself cannot be taken for granted, the level of living people want or aspire to cannot justifiably be ignored. Indeed, in such countries the level of aspirations may be more important in explaining unrest than the realized or expected level of living.[17]

The author of the above statement further developed this aspiration theory by assuming that a difference between what an individual wanted and what he actually expected, based on past realizations, could provide an indicator for determining the degree of economic satisfaction or dissatisfaction existent in a given society. This indicator, while it could serve to explain economic discontent, could not show what form the unrest might take, one of which would be revolution.[18]

In considering the masses, and in an attempt to guide any efforts in their behalf, including Civic Action, a slip-shod and pragmatic approach has not always provided a solution. Balance has been the principal factor in any successful approach to this problem of the masses in the underdeveloped areas, and Civic Action programs, without a balanced approach, would not be considered an exception. They would merely aggravate conditions which the concept was designed to

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[17] Ronald G. Ridker, "Discontent and Economic Growth," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. XI, No. 1, (October, 1962), pp. 1-15.

[18] Ibid., p. 6.

avert. An example of how improper balance in any given area might reap negative results has been exemplified in the following statement.

> The need for the expansion of education is urgent and obvious. We should use caution in that expansion along these lines adds to an increased effectiveness in mass communications, thereby resulting in a rise in aspirations. This in itself, forging ahead of the ability of the national government to meet the expectation level of the masses, let alone their aspirations, can give rise to considerable unrest and chaos. Letting one know what he could aspire to without the capability to satisfy the aspiration, could be self-defeating.[19]

In Civic Action, the emphasis has been on getting things done of a physical nature which could provide some immediate benefit to the people involved in the program.

The problem of reaching the masses in the remotest areas of a recipient country has also shed favorable light on the Civic Action approach as opposed to other "grass roots" programs. The fact that the indigenous military forces have not only been able to bring worthwhile improvements to these areas, but that they have been able to do so without being intimidated by terrorists and insurgents has further enhanced the credibility of the concept.[20]

The Philippine example of United States participation in a Civic Action operation has contained valuable lessons concerning the masses

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[19] S. G. Triantis, "Foreign Aid--Unrestricted or Conditional," Ibid., p. 101.

[20] David Hurfel, "Foreign Aid and Social Reform in Political Development: A Philippine Case Study," The American Political Science Review, Vol. LIII, No. 2, (June, 1959), p. 478.

which should not be overlooked in any such undertaking. In that endeavor, the Civic Action achievement had been subjected to many impediments which have been present in similar instances more recently. The government was relatively new, the country was under heavy attack from communist subversive elements, known as "Huks," and most important, the remote village masses were the central figures in the insurgent action.[21]

> The Huks were recruiting most of their support from the tenant farmers, who were being exploited by landlords and bankers in a near-feudal system of economic peonage. . . .[22]

Reports emanating from investigation of the Civic Action endeavor in the Philippines gave special emphasis to the particular problem of the masses. Other facets of the operation were also covered, but a story of a particular peasant involved, and what the action meant to him, has merited repeating in some detail.

> One of the strongest elements of the developing community is found in its economic progress. . . .
>
> Eusebio Montano, 43 years of age, brought his wife and eight children to EDCOR [Economic Development Corps, the Philippine Army designation for the Civic Action operation] in February 1951. . . . Their total assets amounted to one ax, three bolos, the clothing on their backs plus one change of garments, and several sleeping mats. . . .

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[21] The President's Committee to Study the U. S. Military Assistance Program, Supplement, Annexes, Vol II (August, 1959), p. 134.

[22] U. S. Government, Department of Defense, "Civic Action: The Military Role in Nation Building," This Changing World, Vol. III, No. 14, (15 January, 1964), p. 1.

> After two years, the Montanos were self-supporting. Eusebio owes the government 2000 pesos [1peso was the equivalent of one-half dollar, American currency] . . . . He expects to repay this amount without difficulty within a period of five years. . . .
>
> Eusebio can count on an income of 4,000 pesos a year from 2 hectacres of coffee alone; and a yearly income of 10,000 pesos becomes a distinct possibility. When asked how much the farm was worth, Eusebio pondered a minute and replied, 'I wouldn't take 6,000 pesos for it.' To the ex-peasant, this amount was the ultimate for comparison.[23]

Could the above be considered representative of an isolated success story? Perhaps so today, since the follow-up of the Civic Action program has been considered a failure in view of the excellent start it had.[24] It has reflected a case, however, where the possible realizations of an individual actually exceeded his aspirations--a condition hardly likely to have been susceptible to dissatisfaction and discord.

The lack of mass initiative has had a negative effect on any potentially successful Civic Action or other development undertaking. The problem in the past has been to discount this hindrance as a disadvantage with which the operators had to contend. "There are two sources of cultural and personal obstacles to change," wrote one

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[23] Alvin H. Scaff, The Philippines' Answer to Communism (Stanford U. Press, 1955), pp. 97-98.

[24] The President's Committee, loc. cit.

author in 1959, "(1) attitudes and values which resulted from a colonial heritage, and (2) indigenous cultural values . . . such as belief in certain religions."[25] He surmised that barriers from the first source resulted in such things as a loss of leadership, overurbanization, a dislike for whites, and mass disillusionment due to a very slow rate of growth. The second source presented such problems as an over-emphasis on religious aspects of life as compared to materials, class stratification and age status, an anti-science mentality, and a lack of national consciousness.[26]

If any or all of the above observations have been accepted, then there could have been little amazement caused by the statement that Civic Action holds no unheralded secret for complete success. However, where a relationship has been drawn between those barriers, such as the leadership factor, and the Civic Action concept and what it was designed to do, considerably more hope for success with Civic Action can be justified.

The Indigenous Military Forces

The Civic Action concept has been developed around the nucleus of the indigenous military establishment. Several reasons for the selection of this element of the societies of the underdeveloped states

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[25] Phillip M. Hauser, "Cultural and Personal Obstacles to Economic Development in the Less Developed Areas," Human Organization, Vol. XVIII, No. 2, 1959, p. 78.

[26] Ibid.

have been alluded to previously. Their utilization in the areas of political, social, and economic advancement has been considered prudent in the following ways:

1. The military establishment, like the civil service, transcends regional boundaries and loyalties within the nation, and this has been considered a desirable attribute within a developing area.[27]

2. In insurgency ridden areas, where civil protection has not been considered optimum, the national military forces have been able to gain access to those regions, and Civil Action has provided the government with an instrument with which it might enhance national loyalties within the masses.[28]

3. Training, which has always been a basic function of any sound military establishment, has provided a valuable source of skilled manpower and organization which would otherwise be lacking in many of the underdeveloped nations. In a development context, a nation which did not fully utilize the military in such activities might be considered not employing its total resources in that development effort.

4. The military forces of the underdeveloped areas, in a majority of instances, have not found themselves involved in actual military operations which have demanded their full employment for the survival

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[27] Edward Shils, "The Military in the Political Development of the New States," in John J. Johnson (ed.), The Role of the Military in Underdeveloped Countries (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1962), p. 32.

[28] Maj. Gen. Wm. B. Rosson, USA, "Understanding Civic Action," Army, Vol. XIII, No. 12 (July, 1963), p. 51.

of their nation. The latent potential of these forces has become apparent, and the fact that such establishments have been universally existent has further elicited their utility in the area of socio-economic development.

5. In a negative sense, the absence of other effective elements through which development might be pursued and nurtured has furthered the use of the military in the Civic Action role.

It has become increasingly evident that many problem areas have been brought to light or have been newly created by the fact that the indigenous military has been placed in this dubious position of relative national importance. It has been unfortunate, perhaps, that many of the distasteful problems in the underdeveloped states involving the military have been so closely associated with this nation's efforts in the Civic Action field. Many states have been troubled by civil-military relations historically, and it would be safe to assume that situations would not change appreciably in this regard with or without Civic Action programs. Such situations should be considered in any event, so that the effect of Civic Action on them might be viewed in a truer perspective, even though a definitive relationship between Civic Action and the civil-military problem has not been determined in this writing.

It might also be considered superfluous to assert that the position of the armed forces involved in Civic Action endeavors, if not properly

ided or persuaded, could be used for devious purposes. The concept has been successfully applied in the United States, but equal success, especially in the critical area of indigenous military employment, in countries where the foundations of civil-military relations have not been so firmly inculcated, would be expecting too much of Civic Action. The direction any one particular nation's military establishment might follow has depended as much on the establishment itself than on any other single influencing factor.

The armed forces of the underdeveloped states, and their involvement in the political machinations of their governments, have not created a pleasant image in the minds of the American people.[29] That this attitude has been fostered, and has continued to flourish, has not necessarily been the result of narrow-mindedness, superior thinking, or civilian prejudice on the part of the United States. There have been too many instances throughout the history of the Latin American states, and more recently within the newly independent nations, of military "coups d'etat" which have resulted in the sudden demise of ostensibly duly instituted constitutional governments. The American national

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[29] General Curtis E. LeMay, USAF, Address to the Central States Shrine Association, St. Louis, Missouri, October 19, 1963, as cited in U. S. Government, Department of Defense, Air Force Information Policy Letter, Supplement for Commanders, No. 125 (November, 1963), p. 18. The General stated that: ". . . However, our progress. . . could be jeopardized by the interpretation that some people are placing on military coups in Latin America. They see these developments as a basis for discontinuing military assistance across the board. . . ."

temperament has not been capable of adjusting to such actions by the military at the expense of constitutionally legitimate governments. It has been assumed almost categorically that any accession to control by the military in any country, by whatever means, could only be detrimental to that country's progress. It has been common practice in past years to label any such action unconstitutional, illegal, and politically unsound.

In developing a Civic Action concept, the previously mentioned attitudes and feelings have not provided a sufficiently concrete basis upon which to proceed. It has been considered necessary to consider the indigenous military establishments of these states within the context of their own society and surroundings, and not on the basis of traditional United States civil-military relationships, since the latter might be considered unique in its rarity. The social consciousness, source of officer leadership, and role (realistic or functional) of these military establishments traditionally, as compared to the modern philosophy within the leading elements, has warranted a reassessment of the traditional American way of thinking in this critical area if it is to succeed, or at least prevent failure in its endeavors.

This reassessment has been begrudgingly forthcoming.[30] In short, it has been the impression of some people in positions of authority

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[30]The Denver Post, March 25, 1964.

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within the United States that not all military "coups," in every instance, have constituted an irrevocable catastrophe for the nation concerned, and/or for American interests in relation to it.[31]

There can be no question concerning the fact that the local military establishments in the underdeveloped countries which have embraced the Civic Action concept have been placed in a delicate position. In those areas where Civic Action has been undertaken, and the military forces have not been preoccupied with active counterinsurgency operations, such as Latin America, the relationship between Civic Action and the position of the military as a result of those operations has been rather nebulous. Such conditions have worked a hardship on those elements of the military which have not been properly educated in the proper application of the concept. They have had to combat the tendency to look upon such functions as having opted the primary mission of national defense. Where such education has been initiated and received in the proper perspective, the attitudes of the military forces

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[31] The Denver Post, October 9, 1963. The reason for the change of heart by some State Department officials, as reported in the news article, had been the fact that modern military rulers ". . . are less dictatorial than their predecessors. . . ." However, the policy of the United States, as reported in the same article dealing with a State Department briefing, was ". . . the United States is opposed to all military coups and believes they should be dealt with vigorously. While the military are in office, the United States expects them to move toward a return to civil government, keep civil liberties, and undertake some reform."

toward Civic Action have been noticeably favorable.[32]

There have been instances where the military has not hesitated to take control of the government when they felt the national objectives were being stymied by those in power. Such excuses as the inability of the government to discern and control developments which would have ostensibly led to a communist take-over have been used as justification for their action.[33] Another common explanation for such action by the military forces has been the absence of, or the slowness of action by the government designed to bring about the desired or promised reforms. Evidence regarding the effect Civic Action has had in those areas experiencing a growing number of "coups" has been insufficient to provide any conclusive relationships. While it might be possible to draw some correlation in an adverse sense, it could also be perhaps as effectively proved that the association of these forces with Civic Action operations has contributed to the more recent tendency of "juntas" to reflect progressive, rather than traditionally conservative philosophies when they do accede to control.

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[32] Time, Vol. 83, No. 8 (February 21, 1964), p. 43. A convincing article on Civic Action in operation in Columbia, where the application of the concept has appeared to be taking effect, and the military forces have contributed an invaluable service to the overall development efforts of the government.

[33] Rosson, op. cit., p. 49. The article carried a statement by former president Ydigoras of Guatemala which heaped praise upon the military for their efforts in Civic Action. It was ironic that he was subsequently deposed by those people for his "inability" to control communism within the country.

Military leadership in the underdeveloped countries has been divided into two segments--older, World War II and prior, and the present generation of officers--in an effort to show that the above statement of progressive "juntas" may hold a degree of credibility. The point of concern has been whether or not Civic Action has led to increased militarism, or has provided the military forces in the underdeveloped areas with a new sense of purpose, leading to greater civil-military co-operation, and a lesser readiness to assume control of governments as a result of continued frustrations.

Some characteristics of the older groups of military leaders of the less developed states, where the initiative for decisive action against the government in power was comparatively less (from the standpoint of instituting social reform, and such), have been:

1. A small, well-educated, elite, conservative group.

2. A socially highly stratified, non-communicable group with relation to the aspirations of the masses. They fostered the concept of a high class/low class, intelligensia/illiterate division within the country.

3. The positions of command occupied by the senior officers in those times prior to Civic Action type programs gave them no opportunity to gain an association with the people, something Civic Action was designed to sponsor.

4. These officers tended to reflect an attitude which would permit

them to strive for and cling to positions of security, and they also showed an affinity for adapting politically to positions of prestige.

5. If and when this group had been driven to resist the happenings in government, the moving force more often than not was the drive for personal power, or the enhancement of the position of the military in general, but generally not in behalf of the great majority of the masses, whose lot usually remained the same in any event.[34]

The present generation of officers who have been directly involved in the operational implementation of programs of a Civic Action nature have undoubtedly been influenced in some manner.

1. A large number of these leaders have been the object of much of the U. S. training programs associated with military assistance in general. This training has not been completely military in nature.[35]

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[34] Edwin Lieuwen, Arms and Politics in Latin America (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, F. A. Praeger, 1960), pp. 125-132. The compilation of characteristics of this group, as well as those of the younger generation of officers, has been the writer's summation based on factors mentioned in various other writings in this general area.

[35] Robert J. Wood, General, U. S. A., an address before The Conference on New Nations and Their Internal Defense, U. S. M. A., West Point, New York, April 19, 1963. General Wood, then Director of Military Assistance, gave the number of foreign military personnel trained by the United States in 1962 alone as 27, 830. He also stated that ". . . they are the coming leaders of their nations."

2. In Civic Action and/or counterinsurgency operations, the officer corps of the indigenous military forces have been closely associated with the masses, their problems, and their aspirations and needs. None has been considered immune to at least a minimal influence as a result of that association. Having been closely allied with the sources of much of the discontent within their countries, coupled with the added frustration of not witnessing proper reform action by the government, could possibly explain the added tendency of these groups to become involved in "coups."

3. The younger elements of the officer corps in these states have usually had no position too dear to change, and more often than not, have stood a chance of gaining considerably through drastic action.

4. A greater proportion of the officers of this group have not descended from the aristocracy. Even those who have had such lineage, not all have been without revolutionary fervor (resulting perhaps from their exposure to philosophies other than traditional ones, but not necessarily altruistic ones).

5. This group has also developed aspirations of their own, and they have often been tied to the destiny of the country they serve.[36]

The assumption of power by the military, and subsequent control by "junta" has not been considered an acceptable solution to the

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[36] Edwin Lieuwen, loc. cit. Also, The Washington Post, July 26, 1963; and, The Denver Post, December 9, 1963.

problems of government in the less developed states. It has not been condoned by the United States in its relations with these nations in the past. The United States, as a result, has frequently found itself powerless to act in the face of an accomplished fact, and has eventually recognized such take-overs out of necessity, and in an effort to protect its interests or exert a favorable influence in these areas. Aside from the anti-democratic taint of a military government, the principal danger inherent in this type control has been the deleterious effect it has had on any hoped-for eventual development in the direction of government by democracy. "Junta" control has usually been accompanied by suppression of any opposition, and a generally tighter political control than had previously existed. The highly concentrated political control found in a military government has also revealed an added danger which has become evident in such situations as Cuba, where effective control of the government was gained with relative ease principally because that power was so narrowly dispersed. The damage caused to political processes, where they may have existed previously, has been assessed as even more undesirable and potentially explosive than a struggling pseudo-democratic government with all its inadequacies.[37]

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[37] Dr. Albert E. Burke, "The Formula," Probe, a reprinted publication of a television program of the same name presented on KLZ-TV, Denver, Colorado, March 24, 1964.

When realistically assessed from the standpoint of increased military participation and control in these governments, and the definitely limited guidance the United States could provide (without being asked), it has been felt that a propitious approach for this nation would be that of Civic Action. That this nation should foster increased military activity in politics has not been asserted. It has been felt that an excess of this sort of activity has been, and will continue to be encountered irregardless of the established position of the United States. Given such conditions, and the liklihood of their continuance in the future, it has not been considered likely that this nation's interests would be ill-served by providing the assistance necessary to allow the military forces of the underdeveloped states to engage in Civic Action programs. The United States Congress has shown its awareness of the potential of such activities by this nation when it reported in 1962 that:

> In many of the less developed societies the military officer class is among the most enlightened and competent elements of the population. And in the absence of stable and viable political institutions in some of these countries, it is hardly surprising that elements capable of leadership should grasp it. At that point, the question turns on the quality and the motivation of the leadership. . . . The Ambassadors and their staffs should keep as closely in touch as possible with the military training program.[38]

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[38] U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Assistance Act of 1962, Report of Committee on S. 2996, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., Report No. 1535 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1962), p. 35.

Bulldozers for tanks, engineers for military tacticians, village wells for foxholes and trenches, and building implements for arms could provide, where the change-over could be effected, a new sense of direction for the military. The benefit derived from such activity would be an increased degree of loyalty among the indigenous government, the masses, and the military.

CHAPTER V

CIVIC ACTION AND COUNTERINSURGENCY

The renewed prominence of the age-old tactic of guerrilla warfare has given tremendous emphasis to the concept of Civic Action. Since guerrilla warfare has played a major role in dramatizing the need for such programs as Civic Action, a discussion of this form of conflict has been considered appropriate for a proper understanding of the role that Civic Action might assume. The discussion has been restricted to the reasons this phenomenon of special warfare has had, or should have such a favorable influence toward Civic Action on those responsible for devising methods of combatting the guerrilla menace; or, what is contained in the Civic Action concept which has proved so attractive to these individuals striving to avert disaster in the underdeveloped areas of the world.

One method of resolving the above relationship has been to take a closer look at unconventional warfare (within the context of this writing, unconventional war and guerrilla war have been considered synonymous). If the criteria for a potentially successful guerrilla campaign can be laid down, then the effectiveness of Civic Action in this regard might become more apparent. To add further meaning to the findings, the criteria described have been those professed by

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One method of resolving the above relationship has been to take a closer look at unconventional warfare (within the context of this setting, unconventional war and guerrilla war have been considered synonymously). If the attempts for a peaceful successful guerrilla campaign can be laid down, then the effectiveness of Civic Action in this regard might become more apparent. To add further justification to the findings, the criteria described have been those developed by

the communists, since these have been the primary concern of the United States. This nation has been engrossed in containing and combatting communist advances throughout the world by any means. Its search for methods to counter unconventional warfare has not arisen solely from a desire to put an end to this form of conflict, but to stop it because the communists have now adopted it as a principal tactic in their expansionist endeavors. It has become widely known and accepted that not all efforts in this direction have been communist inspired. Revolutionary activity in the underdeveloped states has provided a unique opportunity for the communists, however, and they have not hesitated to exploit every conceivable opening available to them for the purpose of maximizing their political gains in areas made vulnerable by the disruptive tactic of guerrilla war.[1]

The folly of engaging in more precisely defined forms of aggression, and the inherent dangers involved therein have been mentioned previously (pp. 7-10, above). The unacceptable prospects of other forms of warfare, in addition to the existing conditions now prevalent throughout most of the underdeveloped world, have given a new impetus to the subversive, insurgent, and more clandestine method of

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[1] W. W. Rostow, "Guerrilla Warfare in the Underdeveloped Areas," in T. N. Greene, The Guerrilla and how to Fight Him (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1962), pp. 54-55.

unconventional warfare. The complete answer has not been wrapped up in the nuclear phenomenon, and this fact has become even more apparent when the relationship between Civic Action and guerrilla warfare is understood.

Unconventional Warfare and the Requirements of Counterinsurgency

The Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung, has been most commonly referred to as the grand master of the art of unconventional war.[2] He has written extensively on the subject, and has more recently been copied by many of the modern-day, recently arrived, "authorities" in the same field.[3]

Mao's treatises on guerrilla warfare have set forth certain precepts which might be considered inviolable if success in this kind of war is to be expected. He repeatedly emphasized the necessity for political goals, and indicated further that those goals must be in coincidence with the desires of the people.[4] To insure a proper relationship between the political goals of the war and the people's wants, the requirement for supervisors (cadres) and ample propaganda equipment

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[2] Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961).

[3] Che Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare (New York: F. A. Praeger, 1961).

[4] Samuel B. Griffith, op. cit., pp. 42ff.

[illegible] service has not been changed
by in the Soviet Government, and this fact has brought into
question again the relationship between civil action and guerrilla war-
fare in Yugoslavia.

Unconventional Warfare and the Dangerousness of Counterinsurgency

The Chinese Communist leader, Mao Tse-Tung, has been quite
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quirement for legitimacy (basis) and local [illegible] emphasis

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[3] Samuel B. Griffith, Mao Tse-Tung on Guerrilla Warfare (New
York: F. A. Praeger, 1961).

[4] Tom Sawyer, Communist Tactics (New York: F. A. Praeger,
1961).

[5] Griffith, op. cit., pp. 45ff.

within each unit was deemed essential.[5] The now-famous analogy of Mao's which compared the masses to the waters of the sea, and the guerrillas as fish swimming therein has vividly accentuated the need for a communion of these elements in this type war.[6] Mao strongly criticized the traditionally Western military view that ". . . we are not interested in politics but only in the profession of arms."[7] He called such thinking ". . . simple minded."[8]

Particular emphasis was placed on the operation in the initial stages, and the need for concentrating action on the exterior lines. A foothold must be gained, psychologically or militarily, and this could best be accomplished in the peripheral areas where (in an underdeveloped state) strong government support, ample protection, and organized economic, political, and administrative machinery would be least effective, or non-existent.

Most of the underdeveloped areas of the world have exhibited a susceptibility for this type infiltration. The accumulation of most of the prerequisites for a potentially successful guerrilla campaign, as

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[5] Ibid., p. 86.

[6] Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 44.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

[5] Ibid., p. 84.

[6] Marine Corps Gazette, Vol. 46, No. 1 (January, 1962), p. 41.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Ibid.

ordered in the communist philosophy, are found in these underdeveloped states--a weak underdeveloped economy, national confusion, lack of a meaningful national purpose throughout the masses, a weak government, uneducated people clinging to the tribal society, and no effective balance in national political power.[9]

The requirement for a co-operative civic-military relationship in a counterinsurgency operation has been repeatedly stressed.

> Popular support is indispensable to the guerrilla because he is militarily weak, a fact easily forgotten. After all, the guerrilla fights as he does because he lacks the weapons . . . and often numbers to fight in any other way. Seldom if ever has anyone deliberately chosen a guerrilla strategy when other choices existed.[10]

It has also been sufficiently emphasized that the character of unconventional warfare has demanded more than a strictly military approach to the problem (see pp. 54-57, above).

> Approaches that unduly stress either military or non-military action are the worst kinds of oversimplification, though each may seem tempting when one has lost patience with a more complex approach. Only by constantly recalling the fundamental structure of guerrilla movements, and by putting . . . theoretical distinctions into practice, can the intricate but essential co-ordination of political and military action be maintained toward ultimate success.[11]

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[9] James E. Cross, Conflict in the Shadows (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 15-18.

[10] Peter Paret and John W. Shy, "Guerrilla Warfare and U. S. Military Policy: A Study," in T. N. Greene, op. cit., p. 40.

[11] Ibid., p. 53.

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[9] James E. Cronin, Conflict in the Shadows (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1963), pp. 12-13.

[10] Peter Paret and John W. Shy, Guerrilla Warfare and U. S. Military Policy: A Study," in T. N. Greene, op. cit., p. 40.

[11] Ibid., p. 52.

What might be considered to be a co-ordinated balance of the military and political action considered so essential in the above statement? Sir Gerald Templer, the British leader who has been credited with the particularly successful venture of the British in Malaya against communist guerrillas there, has given some indication as to what he considered proper balance. He stated that:

> Ever since the High Commissioner and I came here we have known very well indeed that the shooting side of this affair was only one-quarter of the trouble. The thing that really matters is the other three-quarters. We knew that we must get at the hearts and minds of the people to condition against this beastly communism. The way to do that is through proper schooling, health, housing and social and political advance generally.[12]

The above statement was recorded as a successful leader's view as to how a guerrilla campaign might be defeated. A striking similarity has been seen in the comparison of Templer's statement and those previously quoted in this writing which have represented official U. S. policy in the field of Civic Action (pp. 43-44, above).

Civic Action could be justified in terms of national strategy. This nation has amassed a capacity for destruction which has been considered practically incomprehensible. The need for such a tremendous killing capability has been justified in terms of relative strengths. It

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[12] Dr. Albert F. Burke, "The Foxy Imperialist," Probe, a reprinted version of a television program of the same title presented on KLZ-TV, Denver, Colorado, March 11, 1964.

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[12] Lt. Robert T. Parks, "The Army Imperialist," Cycle, a reprinted version of a lecture presented at the Civic Affairs Clinic on 11-17, Denver, Colorado, March 11, 1964.

has been felt generally that if a potential enemy were to find this nation lacking in nuclear strength, our deterrent effectiveness would be seriously undermined, possibly leading to unacceptable consequences. From the course of events which have transpired since the arrival of the age of nuclear parity, however, it has been assumed by the writer that a nuclear aggression while the balance is maintained (except by accident) might be ruled out as an alternative method of forcing political demands. That is, in a nuclear sense, the deterrent idea has worked. Working under this nuclear umbrella, the leaders of the various communist groups have turned to the guerrilla warfare concept as a primary method of furthering their interests and influence in the less developed areas. It is felt that Civic Action, serving as an effective weapon in areas susceptible to guerrilla penetration, should be considered as essential to this nation's total defense as the nuclear deterrent, under prevailing conditions. To have been immeasurably weakened by one devastating holocaust, or in bits and pieces through the gradual tactic of protracted war, has revealed a difference which is significant only in terms of the relative times required to carry out either action.

Guerrilla wars cannot be won by Civic Action. Neither can guerrilla warfare, unless allowed to advance to the point where these groups become organized "conventional" military armies, accomplish

the political aims for which it was initially undertaken.[13] Counter-insurgency operations conducted to minimize or eradicate any guerrilla threat have been relied upon to bring these explosive conditions under control. The problem has in no way been solved, however, if no action is directed toward removing the source of the discontent which originally gave rise to a guerrilla or other revolutionary uprising. Civic Action, by whatever name, has been an integral part of any successful counter-guerrilla operation. Where the concept has shown its true potential has been in its applicability in controlling or combatting those conditions upon which guerrilla forces have initially fed, and gained momentum. It should be considered equally important as counterinsurgency, or complementary to it in areas which could be classified as "active," and of even greater importance in fomenting and other "passive" areas.

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[13] E. L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Mao Tse-Tung," in T. N. Greene (ed.), op. cit., p. 19.

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[13] E. L. Katzenbach, Jr., "Time, Space, and Will: The Politico-Military Views of Sun Tze-Tung," in I. M. Emmons (ed.), *op. cit.*, p. 19.

CONCLUSIONS

The ranks have closed. The opponents of the United States foreign aid program have become increasingly effective in their efforts to seriously curtail government spending in this vital area. Persistent cries by the sponsors of aid who have asserted that cutting the aid program would be tantamount to aiding and abetting the communist conspiracy have only given rise to further indignation from the opposing forces. If there were some sort of guarantee which could be offered that so many dollars in foreign aid would rid the nation and the world of the "communist conspiracy," doubtless those funds would be approved and appropriated with all due facility. Obviously, no such guarantee has been, nor shall be forthcoming. But what if it could be made?

With world conditions as they are, and have been since the end of the Second World War, could the United States eliminate aid and continue to pursue its national objectives in a peaceful environment? In the nation-state system, with all its inherent conditions, the conflict of ideologies would be readily replaced by conflicts of various nature. The added turmoil within the underdeveloped world, initiated or enhanced in part by the processes of assistance, certainly could not be subdued by the cessation of these programs.

Communism has presented problems of grave concern to the

nation. The problem has not been contained solely in the "conspiracy" phenomenon, however; and the desirability for creating and developing conditions of stability and peace within these underdeveloped areas has also shown some considerable degree of attractiveness. Foreign aid, whether proffered from a national, regional, or international level, has become more of a necessity in any attempts to further these conditions, especially if they are to be successful. The relative size of an aid program, in terms of dollars needed, has not been of primary concern in this thesis. There have been certain indications prevalent in the polemics concerning the amount of aid the United States should commit to such programs which have suggested that more, and not less financial assistance would be warranted in the future. The more obvious ones have been:

1. The population "explosion" and its net effect on the economic growth in an underdeveloped nation. Development through self-help and assistance has been subjected to the per-capita income growth measurements, and in some areas, such as Latin America, the outlook has been anything but favorable. That is not to say that more aid, without further reforms internally, would alleviate the situation, but neither has there been any evidence that less assistance would improve conditions.

2. In many of the underdeveloped states, the process of development and modernization has not yet reached what the economists have

referred to as "the take-off stage." When the conditions within these nations have reached the stage of more effective utilization of capital (the absorptive capacity has increased), there has been every reason to suspect that greater demands for legitimate economic assistance should be expected.

3. With an increased trend indicating that guerrilla warfare has proved its utility in the age of overkill, it should not be surprising that more assistance of a military and economic nature might be required. To combat this menace from military, economic, political, and psychological directions has proved to be an expensive undertaking.

Military assistance allocations have generally stabilized in recent years, except in areas such as South Vietnam. The Congress has, in effect, placed a ceiling on such spending, and it has not been felt that the lid could be pushed much higher, barring unforeseen developments. Military assistance increases to many of the underdeveloped could not be justified in any event. It has not proved helpful to the interest of the United States to maintain non-progressive minorities in power, when that power has been drawn from the indigenous military support, strengthened by United States arms assistance.

National power, without the support of the majority of the people, has proved to be baseless and eventually the element which has been successful in consolidating that support usually has prevailed. That such support has been betrayed subsequent to a revolution has shown

some significance, since the communists have been known to gain control through such manouvering. Their success has not been made any less attainable by United States assistance which has fostered the concentration of political power in the hands of a small minority. A more diversified system of control within any country would decrease the likelihood of a successful take-over by undesirable organizations, such as the communists.

The Civic Action concept has revealed some significant advantages when viewed as an instrument of foreign aid policy. It has been aimed at the realistic level of progress in the underdeveloped world. The programs associated with a Civic Action approach have been directed toward the remote areas of troubled nations. They have to some degree lessened the "overshoot" characteristic of orthodox economic and military assistance programs, where larger and more costly projects have been the more preferable among the leading elements of the recipient states. Civic Action has been designed to fully utilize the latent potential of the indigenous military establishments, where otherwise these forces would undoubtedly merely continue to constitute a serious drain on the national economic power, with little or no return in realistic development benefits.

Civic Action has shown advantages in other ways in countries where the prerequisites for implementing such programs have been found:

1. The modernization process has been started at the bottom, in the local community with relatively small, inexpensive, tangible benefit-producing projects, where it should be started.

2. It has provided a means whereby national concern for remote, insurgency-ridden areas might be aided and protected--such conditions having been considered essential in maintaining any degree of national control.

3. Properly implemented, Civic Action would assist in creating and further developing a sense of nationhood--a condition found to be seriously lacking among the states in the underdeveloped world. Participation in programs of Civic Action by the military has often provided an identifying factor for the masses in these areas where no other such instrument has existed effectively.

4. States have always had military establishments. These forces, through their participation in Civic Action, have proved to be an important by-product of the military-Civic Action relationship. The men involved in these operations have gained valuable training. It would be expected that, upon their return to civilian life, with proper background indoctrination in such operations, and a hopefully broadened education and outlook, however basic, these groups might contribute more to the national effort than they would with simply a knowledge of firearms--a condition inherently dangerous in itself among disgruntled personnel.

Is the Civic Action concept a tool or a trap? It has, by the very nature of its prime moving force--the military--required a tremendously delicate balance to remain properly oriented. With inadequate control, or through leadership not concerned for the pulse of the people, it could yield results more volatile and repulsive than conditions as they have generally existed in the underdeveloped world. In short, it has been considered a means to an end, and not an end in itself. Given present world conditions, and the need to face up to them in whatever small way, Civic Action as an instrument of foreign aid has revealed a unique attractiveness which has not yet been found in other approaches.

In the period of the next decade, with the growing resistance to the foreign aid outlay, it has been considered essential that some method be found which would be equivalent to that contained in the Civic Action concept. It has become generally accepted that the world is now less dangerous but more disorderly than it was a decade ago. However true this feeling may be, it is still a world which must be reckoned with; and the United States stands to gain or lose in the future by its position then. It is in the national interest that the nation make every endeavor to foster within the underdeveloped states conditions of stability and responsibility--a task of such staggering dimensions that it demands the use of every available resource from the United States and the underdeveloped states.

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